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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the filing of separate notices of appeal,
Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure contain an internal
inconsistency. This inconsistency, which has yielded two conflicting and
incompatible lines of judicial interpretation, undermines the coherence of
Tennessee appellate procedure and poses unfairly contradictory outcomes
for similarly situated appellants. To resolve this inconsistency, Tennessee’s
Rules of Appellate Procedure should be reformed.
Under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a),
to perfect an appeal as of right in a civil action, every appellant must file
either independently or jointly a timely notice of appeal. Under these rules,
for example, each of three plaintiffs against whom a judgment was entered
would have to file a notice of appeal to invoke appellate jurisdiction and to
pursue an appeal. Yet at the same time, out of a policy in favor of
simplifying the appellate process, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure
13(a) provides that “separate appeals” are unnecessary. Rule 13(a) thus
indicates that, in separate-appeal scenarios, a timely notice of appeal need
not be filed by every appellant so long as one party has filed an original
notice of appeal. Accordingly, so long as one of three plaintiffs against
whom a judgment was entered files a notice of appeal, the other two
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plaintiffs may invoke appellate jurisdiction and pursue an appeal without
filing or joining any notice of appeal.
These rules not only conflict, but are fundamentally irreconcilable,
and they have unsurprisingly yielded two conflicting lines of judicial
authority regarding the failure to file a separate notice of appeal. One line of
authority, relying solely on Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), dismisses a separate
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction when a separate notice of appeal
has not been filed. By contrast, another line of authority, relying solely on
Rule 13(a), does not dismiss a separate appeal when a separate notice of
appeal has not been filed and goes on to exercise appellate jurisdiction. This
split of authority yields two dramatically opposing results—dismissal with
prejudice versus non-dismissal—arising from a single procedural
circumstance. This inconsistency, which arises from Rule 13(a) itself,
complicates rather than simplifies Tennessee appellate procedure.
This Article focuses on appeals as of right in civil actions,
articulating the need for reform and proposing solutions.1 Because a notice
of appeal functions as a jurisdictional-transfer mechanism, Part I of this
Article sets the stage for evaluating Rule 13(a) by examining the
jurisdictional function of notices of appeal. Part II then addresses the
conflict between Rule 13(a) and Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), exploring the
adoption of Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, relevant Advisory
Commission Comments, and the related split of judicial authority. Finally,
Part III proposes potential solutions for correcting the problem. The
simplest solution is to amend Rule 13(a) by deleting the phrase “separate
appeals,” thus eliminating the conflict and rendering Tennessee’s handling
of separate appeals consistent with Rules 3 and 4. A more complex but
perhaps preferable solution would involve overhauling Tennessee’s noticeof-appeal structure to mirror the systems employed by federal courts and
the majority of states, which require the filing of notices of cross-appeal
and notices of separate appeal. Either of these two solutions is viable.
Although there are other potential solutions, each of them involves
expected difficulties that would render it problematic.
PART I. THE JURISDICTIONAL FUNCTION OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
Appeals involve the transition from a trial court’s exercise of
original jurisdiction to an appellate court’s exercise of appellate
jurisdiction. As a general rule in Tennessee, the triggering event for an
appeal as of right is either the trial court’s entry of a final judgment or its
1. Although this Article focuses on civil appeals, it must be recognized that any of
the amendments of Rule 13(a) discussed here would equally affect criminal appeals.
Because the thirty-day period for filing notices of appeal in criminal actions is nonjurisdictional, the failure to timely file a separate notice of appeal may be excused. See infra
notes 50–51. But consideration must be given from a criminal-law standpoint regarding any
proposed amendment.
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entry of an order certifying a less-than-final judgment as immediately
appealable.2 In either event, a party wishing to ask an appellate court to
alter or to enlarge the judgment in a civil action must perfect its appeal by
filing (either individually or jointly) a notice of appeal within the time
period set by rule.3 The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal serves
as the procedural mechanism for transferring jurisdiction from the trial
court to the appellate court. And in Tennessee, the failure to take this step
when required in a civil action has the reverse consequence: the appellate
court is precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction, and the trial
court’s judgment is rendered permanent. This jurisdictional function of the
notice of appeal in civil actions is crucial to understanding the significance
of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a), which provides that
“separate appeals” are not required.
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
An appeal involves transferring jurisdiction over an action from the
trial court to the appellate court. This transfer of jurisdiction is required
because trial and appellate courts play differing roles, each of which relates
to a specific kind of subject matter. “Subject matter jurisdiction involves a
court’s lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it.”4
Tennessee trial courts, such as Circuit and Chancery,5 have original
jurisdiction over actions; that is to say, they are empowered to decide civil
actions in the first instance, dynamically receiving and evaluating live
testimony and other evidence.6 By contrast, courts of review are typically
2. An appeal “as of right” is an appeal that does not require permission from the
appellate court for it to proceed. TENN. R. APP. P. 3(d); 2 LAWRENCE A. PIVNICK, TENNESSEE
CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 30:3 (2012–2013 ed.).
3. “Perfecting” an appeal means taking the actions required by law to render an
appeal effective. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 389 (2007); PIVNICK, supra note 2.
4. Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2012); see Estate of Brown,
402 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn. 2013).
5. The Tennessee Constitution establishes the judicial branch:
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such Circuit, Chancery and other inferior courts as the Legislature
shall from time to time, ordain and establish; in the Judges thereof, and
in Justices of the Peace. The Legislature may also vest such jurisdiction
in corporation courts as may be deemed necessary.
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. In Tennessee, the Circuit court is a court of general civil
jurisdiction. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-10-101 (2013). Generally speaking, Chancery court has
concurrent jurisdiction with Circuit court over civil matters, with the exception of personalinjury and defamation actions and actions for unliquidated property damages not arising
from a breach of contract. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-11-102(a) (2013); PIVNICK, supra note
2, § 3:4; Henry R. Gibson, GIBSON’S SUITS IN CHANCERY § 1.08 (8th ed. 2004).
6. “Original jurisdiction” is “[a] court’s power to hear and decide a matter before any
other court can review the matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (9th ed. 2009). The
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limited to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, by which they correct errors
based on a fixed, cold, impersonal record.7 Under the Tennessee
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Supreme Court is exclusively
appellate.8 The jurisdiction of the intermediate Tennessee Court of Appeals
is similarly, by statute, appellate only.9
Although American appellate courts have the power to correct the
actions of trial courts, appellate jurisdiction, unlike original jurisdiction, is
fundamentally derivative.10 An appeal may occur only after and in response

Tennessee Court of Appeals has contrasted the exercise of original jurisdiction with the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction by focusing on witness credibility:
One of the most time-honored principles of appellate review is that trial
courts are best situated to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
to resolve factual disputes hinging on credibility determinations.
Accordingly, appellate courts routinely decline to second-guess a trial
court’s credibility determinations unless there is concrete, clear, and
convincing evidence to the contrary. The most often cited reason for this
principle can be traced to the fact that trial judges, unlike appellate
judges, have an opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of the
witnesses while they are testifying.
Mitchell v. Archibald, 971 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
7. See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1994) (discussing difference between original and appellate
jurisdiction).
8. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Duncan v. Duncan, 672 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tenn. 1984);
Pierce v. Tharp, 461 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tenn. 1970). While the intermediate Court of
Appeals performs an error-correction function (though not without a concurrent
responsibility to develop the law), the Tennessee Supreme Court primarily exercises
appellate jurisdiction as a matter of discretion, focusing on developing and clarifying
Tennessee law. See TENN. R. APP. P. 11(a) (discussing the factors for determining whether
the Tennessee Supreme Court will grant an application for permission to appeal); TENN. R.
APP. P. 11 advisory comm’n cmt. (“[D]iscretionary review by the Supreme Court is rarely
granted solely for error-correction purposes.”); Fletcher v. State, 951 S.W.2d 378, 382
(Tenn. 1997) (“[O]btaining permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 is not, by any means,
automatic. Instead, this Court must be convinced that an important consideration justifies
granting review.”); State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tenn. 1992) (observing that the
Tennessee Supreme Court functions “primarily as a law-development court, rather than as an
error-correction court”).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-4-108(a)(1) (2013). “The jurisdiction of this Court is
appellate only; we cannot hear proof and decide the merits of the parties’ allegations in the
first instance.” Reid v. Reid, 388 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), perm. app. denied
(Nov. 20, 2012). Because the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction is set by statute,
however, it is not impossible for the Tennessee General Assembly to provide for original
jurisdiction in that court. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gerbitz v. Curriden, 738 S.W.2d 192, 193
(Tenn. 1987) (determining that the Tennessee General Assembly had chosen to vest the
Court of Appeals with original jurisdiction over a particular matter).
10. See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 913, 932 (1997) (discussing the historical development of appellate process in
America).
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to matters previously adjudicated by a trial court.11 “It is the essential
criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a case already instituted.”12 For this reason, Tennessee
appellate courts generally limit their factual review to matters contained
within the appellate record, which comprises facts that were first
established and vetted in the trial court.13 And for this same reason, as well
as in consideration of fairness and efficiency, appellate courts typically
refuse to entertain legal issues raised for the very first time on appeal.14
B. Transferring Jurisdiction from the Trial Court to the Appellate
Court
Central to the process of transferring jurisdiction from the trial
court to the appellate court is the question of appealability.15 As a general
rule, the event that triggers appealability as of right is the trial court’s entry

11. “Appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies that the issue has been formulated and
passed upon by the trial court.” Houston v. Scott, E2010-01660-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL
121104, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012), perm. app. denied (May 23, 2012); see also In
re Estate of Boykin, 295 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (“At the appellate level,
‘we are limited in authority to the adjudication of issues that are presented and decided in the
trial courts . . . .’”) (citation omitted)). “[T]he appellate courts cannot exercise original
jurisdiction.” Peck v. Tanner, 181 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tenn. 2005). “It is axiomatic that the
appellate jurisdiction of a court in any given case is dependent upon the existence of
jurisdiction, either original or appellate, in the court from which the appeal comes.” Morgan
v. Betterton, 69 S.W. 969, 970 (Tenn. 1902).
12. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 35 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174–76 (1803)).
13. “The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Court of Criminal Appeals may
consider those facts established by the evidence in the trial court and set forth in the record
and any additional facts that may be judicially noticed or are considered pursuant to rule 14.”
TENN. R. APP. P. 13(c). “Only rarely is it proper for an appellate court to consider facts in
addition to those established by the evidence in the trial court.” TENN. R. APP. P. 13 advisory
comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (c); see also TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to
Subdivision (e) (“[U]nder Rule 13(c) the appellate court is generally limited in its review to
those facts set forth in the record.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 14 advisory comm’n cmt. (stating that
the rule permitting consideration of post-judgment facts on appeal “is not intended to permit
a retrial in the appellate court.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 24(e) (“Absent extraordinary
circumstances, the determination of the trial court [as to the contents of the record] is
conclusive.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 36(a) (“[R]elief may not be granted [on appeal] in
contravention of the province of the trier of fact.”). An appellate court “must not act on
matter outside of the record, which would be the exercise of original not appellate
jurisdiction.” McKinley v. Sherry, 70 Tenn. 200, 203 (1879).
14. “It is axiomatic that parties will not be permitted to raise issues on appeal that they
did not first raise in the trial court.” Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 312 S.W.3d 496, 511
(Tenn. 2010). “One cardinal principle of appellate practice is that a party who fails to raise
an issue in the trial court waives its right to raise that issue on appeal.” Waters v. Farr, 291
S.W.3d 873, 918 (Tenn. 2009).
15. Appealability has to do with when a party may properly seek appellate review. See
MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 45.
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of a final judgment.16 Under Tennessee law, a “final judgment” is defined
as one that resolves all issues in an action, disposing of its entire merits and
“leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.”17 Any judgment that
accomplishes less than this is classified as partial and merely
“interlocutory,” leaving it subject to revision by the trial court.18 In the vast
majority of cases, then, the entire merits of the action must be decided for
the judgment to be appealable as of right under Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3.19 Part of the rationale for this rule is to avoid
multiple, piecemeal appeals in a single action, which can result in an
inefficient use of judicial and litigant resources.20
This general rule is not without its exceptions and ambiguities.
Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, a trial court may certify a
less-than-final judgment for appeal as of right where: (1) the judgment fully
resolves a particular claim or the rights and liabilities of a particular party,
notwithstanding the fact that other claims or other parties remain before the
16. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3(a) (“In civil actions every final judgment entered by a trial
court from which an appeal lies to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is appealable as
of right.”). “An appeal as of right is an appeal that does not require permission of the trial or
appellate court as a prerequisite to taking an appeal. There shall be one method of appeal as
of right to be known as an ‘appeal as of right.’” TENN. R. APP. P. 3(d); see also TENN. R.
APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. on Subdivision (d) (contrasting appeals as of right with
appeals by permission).
17. In re Estate of Schorn, 359 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (citation
omitted), perm. app. denied (July 15, 2011); see Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377
(Tenn. 2009); In re Estate of Ridley, 270 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tenn. 2008); see also Discover
Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 488 n.17 (Tenn. 2012) (explaining that for purposes of
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02 and 59, a final judgment “refers to a trial court’s
decision adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties,” while for
purposes of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60, a final judgment “refers both to a
decision adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties and to the fact that
more than thirty days have passed since the final judgment was entered.”).
18. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3(a) (“Except as otherwise permitted in Rule 9 and in Rule
54.02 Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are
involved in an action, any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to
revision at any time before entry of a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and
liabilities of all parties.”); Stidham v. Fickle Heirs, 643 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tenn. 1982); see
also In re Estate of Ridley, 270 S.W.3d at 40 (“By definition, an ‘interlocutory order’ cannot
be a ‘final judgment.’”) (citations omitted); In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645
(Tenn. 2003) (“A final judgment is one that resolves all the issues in the case, ‘leaving
nothing else for the trial court to do.’ In contrast, an order that adjudicates fewer than all of
the claims, rights, or liabilities of all the parties is not final, but is subject to revision any
time before the entry of a final judgment. Such an order is interlocutory or interim in nature
and generally cannot be appealed as of right.”) (citations omitted).
19. “Under [Tennessee] Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 3(a), only a ‘final judgment’ in
a civil action is ‘appealable as of right.’” In re Estate of Ridley, 270 S.W.3d at 40.
20. See Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 745 n.3 (Tenn. 2000) (stating that
“[p]iecemeal appellate review is not favored” and noting “the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review” (quoting Breakstone v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 539 S.W.2d 45,
45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976)).
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trial court; and (2) the trial court expressly determines that “there is no just
reason for delay” of an appeal.21 The propriety of such a certification,
however, requires complete resolution with respect to a particular claim or a
particular party and thus is not assured.22 Further, the entry of a final
judgment does not preclude a trial court from retaining jurisdiction to
decide matters merely “ancillary” to the merits; the potential rub here is
drawing the line between what is “merits” and what is “ancillary.”23 In any
event, determining whether a judgment is final requires the inexact science
of comparing the scope of the judgment both with the scope of the
operative pleadings and with the issues advanced by the parties by motion
and, if applicable, at trial.

21. “When more than one claim for relief is present in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court, whether at law or in equity, may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” TENN. R. CIV.
P. 54.02; see TENN. R. APP. P. 3(a) (“Except as otherwise permitted in Rule 9 and in Rule
54.02 Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are
involved in an action, any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to
revision at any time before entry of a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and
liabilities of all parties.”) (emphasis added); In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d at 646;
Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tenn. 1990) (“An appeal as of right
pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3 lies from the trial court’s entry of final judgment on orders
adjudicating fewer than all claims or parties pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.”).
22. See, e.g., Williams v. Tenn. Farmers Life Reassurance Co., M2010-01689-COAR3-CV, 2011 WL 1842893, at *3, & n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2011) (“An order is not
properly made final pursuant to Rule 54.02 unless it disposes of an entire claim or is
dispositive with respect to a party.”); see also, e.g., Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 558–59
(holding that trial court’s certification under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 was
improper); Christus Gardens, Inc. v. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz,
P.C., M2007-01104-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3833613, at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
2008) (vacating trial court’s certification under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02,
designating appeal as improvident, and remanding action to the trial court).
23. It is not always clear where the line will be drawn. Compare, e.g., TENN. R. APP. P.
4 advisory comm’n cmt. to 1995 Amendment (“A motion for discretionary costs does not
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.”), Born Again Church & Christian Outreach
Ministries, Inc. v. Myler Church Bldg. Sys. of the Midsouth, Inc., 266 S.W.3d 421, 425
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that perfection of an appeal does not prevent trial court from
acting with regard to ancillary matters relating to judgment enforcement), First Am. Trust
Co. v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (same), and
Roberts v. Roberts, E2009-02350-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4865441, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Nov. 29, 2010) (stating that award of discretionary costs is an ancillary matter) with City of
Jackson v. Hersh, W2008-02360-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2601380, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 25, 2009) (dismissing appeal as premature for lack of a final judgment because motions
for attorneys’ fees and discretionary costs as well as disbursement of escrow funds remained
undecided by trial court), and Grand Valley Lakes Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Gunn, W200801116-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 981697, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2009) (remanding
action to trial court for lack of a final, appealable judgment because trial court had not
adjudicated a request for attorneys’ fees).
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Because determining whether a judgment is properly classified as
final is not automatic (even labeling an order as “final” does not necessarily
render it properly appealable), counsel who harbor doubt about the finality
of a judgment often file a protective notice of appeal, which may
subsequently become effective upon the entry of a truly final judgment.24
This practice, though understandable, has the unfortunate collateral effect
of shifting the determination of whether a judgment is final to the
Tennessee Court of Appeals and its staff, who must docket the appeal and
go to the trouble of reviewing and analyzing the record only (frequently) to
conclude that the appeal is premature. The Tennessee Court of Appeals
routinely dismisses appeals as premature on the ground that a final
judgment is lacking.25 Such a dismissal does not, however, necessarily
prejudice the appellant’s right to renew an appeal once a final judgment has
actually been entered below.26
Unless the trial court has entered a judgment properly classified or
certified as final, Tennessee appellate courts typically refuse to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the action. Tennessee courts have sometimes
justified this refusal on the ground that the appellate court simply lacks
24. “A prematurely filed notice of appeal shall be treated as filed after the entry of the
judgment from which the appeal is taken and on the day thereof.” TENN. R. APP. P. 4(d); see
Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 630 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (deeming premature
notice of appeal timely where final judgment was subsequently entered); Swafford v.
Memphis Individual Practice Ass’n, 02A01-9612-CV-00311, 1998 WL 281935, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (same); see also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 267 (2007)
(discussing premature appeals).
25. See, e.g., Miljenovic v. Miljenovic, E2013-00172-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL
1776930 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion under Rule
10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee dismissing appeal as premature for
lack of a final judgment); Milam v. Titlemax of Memphis, LLC, W2012-02209-COA-R3CV, 2013 WL 1739177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013) (same); In re Anna C.T., W201201999-COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 749339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2013) (same); Eslami v.
Derrick, E2012-01200-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 6017937 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2012)
(same); Summer Bay Mgmt., L.C. v. Gatlinburg Town Square Members’ Ass’n, E201201276-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4501700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012) (same); Torres v.
Torres, E2011-00057-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3834054 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012)
(same); Griffith Servs., LLC v. Arrow Gas & Oil, Inc., E2012-00507-COA-R3-CV, 2012
WL 3017020 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2012) (same); Parigin v. Mills, E2012-00418-COAR3-CV, 2012 WL 2873370 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2012) (same). One may ask why the
Court of Appeals routinely classifies such opinions as non-precedential when the Court of
Appeals is deciding a question of law and when the opinions inevitably become available to
the public through the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts’ website, Westlaw,
and other electronic databases.
26. “A prematurely filed notice of appeal shall be treated as filed after the entry of the
judgment from which the appeal is taken and on the day thereof.” TENN. R. APP. P. 4(d); see
TENN. R. APP. P. 4 advisory comm’n cmt. (“Subdivision (d) establishes the general rule that
the right to appeal is not lost by filing a notice of appeal before entry of the judgment
appealed from.”); Smith Cnty. Planning Comm’n v. Carver Trucking, Inc., M2011-00146COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2859931, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2012) (considering appeal
of action that was previously remanded to the trial court because previous appeal had been
premature).
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subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., appellate jurisdiction) over the action and
therefore must dismiss the appeal.27 It is more accurate, however, to say that
Tennessee appellate courts choose as a matter of policy not to exercise
jurisdiction over non-final judgments despite their power to do so.
It is well established that Tennessee appellate courts have the
discretionary power to entertain appeals of judgments that are less than
final. Interlocutory orders may ascend on appeal by means of several
procedural avenues. As discussed above, under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 54.02 a trial court may (so long as certain finality-related criteria
are met) certify an interlocutory order for immediate appeal as of right.
Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, an interlocutory order
may be appealed where both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
exercise their discretion to permit it.28 And under Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 10, the appellate court alone has discretion to permit
an interlocutory appeal when extraordinary circumstances justify it.29
Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that appellate courts have
the discretion simply to suspend the final-judgment requirement of
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a), although it cautions that such
suspension should be exercised only rarely.30 These authorities demonstrate
27. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 224 S.W.3d 165, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); see also
Ingram v. Wasson, 379 S.W.3d 227, 237 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (“Lack of appellate
jurisdiction cannot be waived.”), reh’g denied (Feb. 13, 2012), perm. app. denied (June 25,
2012). The cases cited above that dismissed appeals as premature for lack of a final
judgment, see supra note 25, frequently recite the unqualified proposition that the Tennessee
Court of Appeals lacks “subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal
as of right if there is no final judgment.” Miljenovic, 2013 WL 1776930, at *1
(memorandum opinion under Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee);
see also, e.g., Eslami, 2012 WL 6017937 at *1 (“This Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal if there is no final judgment.”); Torres, 2012 WL
3834054 at *1 (“This court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal
if there is no final judgment.”) (memorandum opinion). Insofar as these and other similar
opinions have been designated as “memorandum opinions” under Rule 10 of the Rules of the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, they are binding only upon the parties to the action and carry
no precedential value; nonetheless, the reasoning contained in them shows how the
Tennessee Court of Appeals understands its own appellate jurisdiction.
28. Appeals by permission, as opposed to appeals as of right, “require that either the
trial court or the appellate court expressly authorize the taking of an appeal.” TENN. R. APP.
P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (d). “An interlocutory appeal is an exception to
the general rule that requires a final judgment before a party may appeal as of right.” State v.
Gilley, 173 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2005); cf. In re Estate of Boykin, 295 S.W.3d 632, 636
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (“Because all of the claims have not been adjudicated, this Court
would have jurisdiction to hear this appeal only if permission to file an interlocutory appeal
had been granted pursuant to Rules 9 or 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure,
or if the order appealed had been made final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules
of Civil Procedure.”).
29. TENN. R. APP. P. 10.
30. See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 empowers appellate courts to suspend the finaljudgment requirement of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a)); see also TENN. R.
APP. P. 2 (providing that, with certain express exceptions, “[f]or good cause, including the
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that the existence of appellate jurisdiction is not, strictly speaking,
contingent upon the entry of a final judgment that resolves “everything,”
leaving the trial court with “nothing” left to do.
Rather, when it comes to drawing a bright line, Tennessee appellate
courts lack appellate jurisdiction only when the issue to be reviewed on
appeal has not first been adjudicated by a trial court. The material
distinction, then, is between appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction,
and the sources of this distinction are the Tennessee Constitution31 and the
Tennessee Code,32 which circumscribe the powers of Tennessee appellate
courts. Jurisdiction is thus properly transferred from the trial court to the
appellate court once the trial court has completed its exercise of original
jurisdiction over the matter to be reviewed (whether a particular issue, the
rights and liabilities of a particular party, or the merits of the action as a
whole), and appellate jurisdiction is lacking only when the trial court has
yet to do so.
C. The Notice of Appeal as Jurisdictional-Transfer Mechanism
In the context of an appeal as of right, the procedural mechanism
for transferring jurisdiction from the trial court to the appellate court is the
notice of appeal. The filing of a notice of appeal has accordingly been
described as “an event of jurisdictional significance.”33 In Tennessee, “[a]n
appeal as of right . . . shall be taken by timely filing a notice of appeal with
the clerk of the trial court as provided in rule 4 and by service of the notice
of appeal as provided in rule 5.”34 The notice of appeal performs two
important functions: it “advises the court and opposing counsel that an
appeal has been taken” and, by designating the judgment appealed from and
the court appealed to, it “clearly describes the matter on appeal.”35
interest of expediting decision upon any matter, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
Court of Criminal Appeals may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules
in a particular case on motion of a party or on its motion and may order proceedings in
accordance with its discretion.”); Williams v. Tenn. Farmers Life Reassurance Co., M201001689-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1842893, at *4–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2011).
31. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The jurisdiction of this [Supreme] Court shall be
appellate only, under such restrictions and regulations as may from time to time be
prescribed by law.”).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-4-108(a)(1) (2013) (“The jurisdiction of the court of
appeals is appellate only.”).
33. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).
34. TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e); see Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tenn.
1996) (“Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the method for
filing an appeal as of right.”). Noncompliance with the service requirements of Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) is not considered a jurisdictional defect. See TENN. R. APP.
P. 5 advisory comm’n cmt. to 1997 amend.; Cobb v. Beier, 944 S.W.2d 343, 345–46, & n.7
(Tenn. 1997); G. F. Plunk Constr. Co. v. Barrett Props., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 215, 216–17
(Tenn. 1982); Keith v. Regas Real Estate Co., E2011-00337-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
6009625, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2011).
35. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 493.
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When a notice of appeal is filed, it has the effect of transferring
jurisdiction from the trial court to the appellate court. “[U]pon the filing of
a notice of appeal, jurisdiction over the case attaches to the appellate court,
and the trial court loses jurisdiction over the matter that is the subject of the
appeal.”36 In other words, the filing of a notice of appeal ends the exercise
of original jurisdiction and begins the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
Once the appellate court obtains jurisdiction over a matter, it retains
exclusive jurisdiction until it issues its mandate, which returns the matter to
the trial court.37 The notice of appeal thus performs the important
administrative function of preventing more than one court (one trial, the
other appellate) from simultaneously exercising jurisdiction over a single
matter. The Tennessee Supreme Court has “decline[d] to adopt a rule that
would allow a case to be pending in more than one court at a time.”38 Of
course, as discussed above, “cases” can and regularly do pend in more than
one court (trial and appellate) at the same time insofar as core merits issues
may be decided on appeal while “ancillary” issues (such as judgment
enforcement) may remain pending in the trial court.39 Further, for example,
36. In re E.J.M., 259 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); see First Am. Trust Co.
v. Franklin-Murray Dev. Co., 59 S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“Perfecting an
appeal vests jurisdiction over the case in the appropriate appellate court.”); Spann v.
Abraham, 36 S.W.3d 452, 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“The legal effect of perfecting an
appeal is to divest the trial court of further authority to act without leave of the appellate
court and to vest jurisdiction in the court of appeals.”); Reed v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 4
S.W.3d 677, 691 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“As a general rule, a trial court loses
jurisdiction to enter orders in a case after one of the parties files a notice of appeal.”);
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 996 S.W.2d 803, 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (“This court’s jurisdiction
attaches upon the filing of the notice of appeal.”); PIVNICK, supra note 2; cf. Griggs, 459
U.S. at 58 (the filing of a notice of appeal “confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and
divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal”).
37. First Am. Trust Co., 59 S.W.3d at 141 (“An appellate court retains jurisdiction
over a case until its mandate returns the case to the trial court.”); see TENN. R. APP. P. 42–43
(regarding mandate); TENN. CODE ANN. § 21-1-810 (2013).
38. Spence v. Allstate Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 586, 596 (Tenn. 1994); see First Am.
Trust Co., 59 S.W.3d at 141 (discussing the “undesirable consequences of permitting a case
to be pending in more than one court at the same time.”); cf. Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58
(observing that it has been “generally understood that a federal district court and a federal
court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.”).
39. See supra note 23 & accompanying text. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(e), which permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction to decide certain motions (such as a
motion to alter or amend a judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04)
notwithstanding the filing of a premature notice of appeal, implies that the trial court will
decide such a motion promptly or, in the event that the trial court does not act promptly, that
the Court of Appeals will remand or stay the appeal until the trial court has issued its
decision. The Advisory Commission Comments clarify this very point:
Subdivisions (b) and (c) specify certain post-trial motions that, if timely
filed, terminate the running of the time for filing notice of appeal. These
tolling provisions may unduly lengthen litigation if such motions are not
ruled on promptly by the trial court. However, unless these motions are
abolished, it would be undesirable to proceed with the appeal while the
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trial court proceedings are not necessarily stayed pending the outcome of an
interlocutory appeal.40 The concern really is to prevent a single issue from
pending simultaneously before both the trial court and an appellate court.
D. The Jurisdictional Effect of Failing to Properly File a Notice of
Appeal
Although some flexibility is afforded regarding the form and
contents of a notice of appeal,41 a party’s failure to perfect its appeal as of
right by timely filing a notice of appeal will deprive the Tennessee Court of
Appeals of jurisdiction over the appeal. In Tennessee, it is well established
that the notice-of-appeal requirement in civil cases is mandatory and
jurisdictional.42 Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e), a party
wishing to appeal as of right must do so “by timely filing a notice of
appeal.”43 Under Rule 4(a), the time limit for doing so is “within 30 days
after the entry of the judgment appealed from.”44 By rule, this time limit is
non-waivable and jurisdictional in civil actions; the grant of discretion to
suspend the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure “shall not permit the
trial court has before it a motion the granting of which would vacate or
alter the judgment appealed from, and which might affect either the
availability of or the decision whether to seek appellate review.
TENN. R. APP. P. 4 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).
40. See Tenn. R. App. P. 9(f) (“The application for permission to appeal or the grant
thereof shall not stay proceedings in the trial court unless the trial court or the appellate court
or a judge thereof shall so order.”). The trial court does, however, lose jurisdiction to decide
the matters that have been specifically certified for interlocutory appeal. “In Rule 9 appeals,
the norm is for the trial court to retain jurisdiction of the case, except for the issues being
appealed.” In re Conservatorship for Allen, E2010-01625-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL
5549037, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2010).
41. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f) (listing required contents of notice of appeal and stating
that “[a]n appeal shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title of notice of appeal.”);
TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (f) (“This subdivision specifies the
content of the notice of appeal. The purpose of the notice of appeal is simply to declare in a
formal way an intention to appeal. As long as this purpose is met, it is irrelevant that the
paper filed is deficient in some other respect.”). A comprehensive analysis of which defects
in content may not be excused lies outside the scope of this Article.
42. See, e.g., Albert v. Frye, 145 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Tenn. 2004) (“The thirty-day time
limit for filing a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in civil cases.”); Jefferson
v. Pneumo Servs. Corp., 699 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (the notice-of-appeal
“time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional in civil cases”); Howse v. Campbell, M199901580-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 459106, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2001) (“[C]ompliance
with Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) is mandatory and jurisdictional in civil cases.”); 2 TENNESSEE
JURISPRUDENCE Appeal and Error § 57 (Paul Ernest ed., 2009 & Supp. 2012).
43. TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e).
44. Rules 3(e) and 4(a) together “require that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within the time prescribed for taking an appeal . . . .” TENN. R. APP. P. 3
advisory comm’n cmt. on Subdivision (e). “The 30-day period . . . in which to file a notice
of appeal is to be uniformly applied.” TENN. R. APP. P. 4 advisory comm’n cmt. on
Subdivision (a).
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extension of time for filing a notice of appeal prescribed in Rule 4.”45
Accordingly, Tennessee appellate courts have repeatedly held in civil
actions that they lack appellate jurisdiction when the appellant has failed to
timely file a notice of appeal.46 Seeking relief from a judgment under
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 does not affect this jurisdictional
requirement.47

45. TENN. R. APP. P. 2; see TENN. R. APP. P. 2 advisory comm’n cmt. (“The exceptions
to this rule [of exercising discretion to suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure] prohibit
the appellate courts from extending the time for taking an appeal as of right . . . . Since filing
a notice of appeal is an essential step necessary to a valid appeal of right, this step should not
be waivable . . . .”); TENN. R. APP. P. 2 advisory comm’n cmt. to 2003 amend. (stating that
the time period for filing a notice of appeal as set forth in Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4 is “jurisdictional”); TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e) (“An appeal as of right to the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or Court of Criminal Appeals shall be taken by timely filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court as provided in Rule 4 and by service of the
notice of appeal as provided in Rule 5 . . . . Failure of an appellant to take any step other
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal but is
ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal.”) (emphasis added); TENN. R. APP. P. 4 advisory comm’n cmt. to
Subdivision (a) (“Nothing in this Rule or any other Rule permits the time for filing a notice
of appeal to be extended beyond the specified 30 days . . . .”); TENN. R. APP. P. 21(b) (“[T]he
court may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal prescribed in Rule 4.”); see also
In re: Amendments to the Tennessee Rules of Procedure & Evidence, No. ADM2013-02056,
at *2 (Tenn. Sept. 11, 2013) (proposing 2014 Advisory Commission Comment on Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 stating that “Rule 2 bars an appellate court from extending
the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a) . . . .”); Johnson v. Hardin, 926
S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tenn. 1996) (“[O]nce a timely notice of appeal is filed, the rules should
not erect unjustified technical barriers which prevent consideration of the merits of the
appeal.”) (emphasis added). By expressly providing that the filing of a timely notice of
appeal in a criminal action is “not jurisdictional,” Rule 4(a) implies that it is jurisdictional in
civil actions. See TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a).
46. See, e.g., Ball v. McDowell, 288 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tenn. 2009) (“[I]f the notice of
appeal is untimely, the Court of Appeals lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.”);
Binkley v. Medling, 117 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tenn. 2003) (“The thirty-day time limit set out in
Rule 4 is jurisdictional in civil cases.”); Arfken & Assocs., P.A. v. Simpson Bridge Co., Inc.,
85 S.W.3d 789, 791 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“In civil cases, the failure to timely file a notice
of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”). Tolling of the
thirty-day period based on the filing of post-trial motions in the trial court, see TENN. R. APP.
P. 4(b), lies outside the scope of this Article.
47. Seeking relief from a final judgment by means of Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 60.02 poses a different question (a trial court’s revision of a final judgment) that
does not directly implicate the jurisdictional aspect of the notice-of-appeal requirement.
Although the Advisory Commission Comment to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a) observes that, “in appropriate circumstances an otherwise untimely appeal may be taken
by first securing relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02,” Rule 60.02 is not
intended to function as a substitute for a timely notice of appeal. See Henderson v. Wilson,
M2009-01591-COA-R3CV, 2011 WL 683905, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2011); In re
Estate of Williams, M2000-02434-COA-R3CV, 2003 WL 1961805, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 28, 2003); City Bank & Trust Co. v. St. John, 1993 WL 414827, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 20, 1993) (memorandum opinion under Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of
Tennessee).
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Characterizing this jurisdictional effect under the auspice of
subject-matter jurisdiction results from a judicial choice, not from the lack
of a constitutional or statutory power to act.48 So long as the trial court has
already exercised original jurisdiction over the matter, neither the
Tennessee Constitution nor the Tennessee Code forbids an appellate court
from addressing an appeal notwithstanding the appellant’s failure to file a
timely notice of appeal.49 In criminal actions, for example, the timelynotice-of-appeal requirement is treated as non-jurisdictional and waivable
“to ensure due process in criminal actions because fundamental interests
such as life and liberty must be protected.”50 In civil actions, which
typically do not involve such fundamental constitutional rights, notices of
appeal are handled less delicately.51 The decision to invest the notice of

48. See supra notes 4–9, 46.
49. See supra Section II(B).
50. State v. Williams, M2011-01169-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2061599, at *5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 8, 2012); see also TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a) (“[I]n all criminal cases the ‘notice
of appeal’ document is not jurisdictional and the filing of such document may be waived in
the interest of justice.”); Mills v. Wong, 155 S.W.3d 916, 925 (Tenn. 2005) (“In criminal
litigation, where an alleged infringement of a constitutional right often affects life or liberty,
conventional notions of finality associated with civil litigation have less importance.”)
(citation omitted).
51. In Tennessee, the timely-notice-of-appeal requirement is treated as nonjurisdictional and waivable in criminal actions on the ground that criminal actions involve
fundamental constitutional rights affecting life and liberty. See supra note 50 &
accompanying text. Although most civil actions involve non-fundamental property rights,
some civil actions—child-custody disputes, for example—can involve governmental action
regarding fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578
(Tenn. 1993) (“[T]he right to rear one’s children is so firmly rooted in our culture that the
United States Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); C.J.H. v. A.K.G., M200101234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002) (“Under the
Tennessee and the United States Constitutions, a parent has a fundamental right to the
‘custody and upbringing of his or her child.’” (quoting In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 187
(Tenn. 1999)). Yet untimely appeals in such civil actions have been dismissed without
consideration of an exception. See, e.g., In re Taurian L C-G, M2013-02183-COA-R3-PT,
2013 WL 5874764, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2013) (dismissing untimely appeal for
lack of appellate jurisdiction in action involving termination of parental rights)
(memorandum opinion under Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee); In
re Jayden B.-H., E2013-00873-COA-R3-PT, 2013 WL 4505389, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
21, 2013) (“This time limitation is jurisdictional and mandatory in civil cases, including
cases dealing with termination of parental rights. This Court has no authority to expand or
waive the thirty-day time limitation.”) (citations omitted). Although there are special,
expedited appellate procedures for cases involving the termination of parental rights, see
TENN. R. APP. P. 8A, the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal remains mandatory
and jurisdictional under those procedures. To the extent that civil actions involve
governmental action regarding fundamental constitutional rights, the constitutional rationale
for treating notices of appeal as non-jurisdictional and waivable in criminal actions but not in
civil actions arguably breaks down. The point here is neither to endorse a constitutionalbased exception in civil actions nor to suggest that there is or should be a constitutional right
of appeal where fundamental rights are at stake, but rather simply to identify a hole in the
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appeal with a jurisdictional effect in civil actions akin to the lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction arises from administrative policies favoring fair notice,
judicial efficiency, convenience, and repose, not from any inherent limit on
the appellate court’s power of review.52
By choosing to impose a mandatory and jurisdictional time limit on
initiating a civil appeal as of right, Tennessee is consistent with the majority
of American jurisdictions. Most jurisdictions impose a time limit on filing a
notice of appeal as of right that authorities characterize not only as
mandatory, but also as jurisdictional, with the consequence that the failure
to satisfy the time limit absolutely precludes the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over a matter.53 Although some jurisdictions instead treat this
rationale for treating appellate jurisdiction in criminal appeals differently from appellate
jurisdiction in all civil appeals.
52. The Comments to Rule 4(a), for example, point out that a thirty-day limit for filing
a notice of appeal “is sufficient time particularly in light of the fact that a party is required to
do nothing to initiate the appellate process except file and serve the notice of appeal.” TENN.
R. APP. P. 4 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a). The Comments to Rule 2 also indicate
that making compliance with this jurisdictional deadline prevents litigants from having to
wait too long for certainty about the trial court’s judgment: “[T]his step should not be
waivable inasmuch as the rights of parties remain uncertain during the time available for
filing a notice of appeal.” TENN. R. APP. P. 2 advisory comm’n cmt. The United States
Supreme Court has offered a similar rationale for federal notice-of-appeal deadlines. See
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 252 (2008) (“The firm deadlines set by the
Appellate Rules advance the interests of the parties and the legal system in fair notice and
finality.”); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 481–82 (1999) (stating that
the “cross-appeal requirement . . . is meant to protect institutional interests in the orderly
functioning of the judicial system, by putting opposing parties and appellate courts on notice
of the issues to be litigated and encouraging repose of those that are not.”).
53. See, e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2014) (imposing mandatory thirty-day period for
filing a notice of appeal in federal civil cases); FED. R. APP. P. 3 General Note (“Rule 3 and
Rule 4 combine to require that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court
within the time prescribed for taking an appeal. Because the timely filing of a notice of
appeal is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ compliance with the provisions of those rules is of
the utmost importance.”) (citation omitted); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 809.10(1)(e) (2014) (“The
notice of appeal must be filed within the time specified by law. The filing of a timely notice
of appeal is necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the appeal.”); Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (“This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the
prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”) (citation omitted); MPQ, Inc. v.
Birmingham Realty Co., 78 So. 3d 391, 394 (Ala. 2011) (“A court must dismiss an appeal
for lack of jurisdiction if a party does not appeal within the time prescribed by statute.”)
(citation omitted); Edwards v. Young, 486 P.2d 181, 182 (Ariz. 1971) (“It is settled in
Arizona that the perfecting of an appeal within the time prescribed is jurisdictional; and,
hence, where the appeal is not timely filed, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction other
than to dismiss the attempted appeal.”); Stacks v. Marks, 127 S.W.3d 483, 485 (Ark. 2003)
(“Timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and we are required to raise the issue
of subject-matter jurisdiction on our own motion.”); Starpoint Props., LLC v. Namvar, 201
Cal. App. 4th 1101, 1107, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58, 63 (2011) (“‘Compliance with the
requirements for filing a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional,’ and an appellate
court therefore must dismiss an appeal that is untimely.”) (citation omitted); Peltz v. Dist.
Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 1992) (“The untimely filing of a
notice of appeal precludes the appellate court from exercising jurisdiction.”); Perlman v.
Perlman, 734 S.E.2d 560, 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he proper and timely filing of a
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timeliness requirement as prudential, and thus subject to exception,54
several of these jurisdictions provide that exceptions will be granted only
rarely, when justified by good cause or extraordinary circumstances.55

notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court.”)
(citation omitted); Ditto v. McCurdy, 80 P.3d 974, 978 (Haw. 2003) (“As a general rule,
compliance with the requirement of the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional,
and we must dismiss an appeal on our motion if we lack jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted);
Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 979 P.2d 118, 121 (Id. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is well-settled that the
failure to timely file a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and shall cause automatic dismissal
of such appeal.”); Secura Ins. Co. v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 902 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ill.
2009) (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is both jurisdictional and mandatory.”);
Bohlander v. Bohlander, 875 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“In Indiana, timeliness
of filing a notice of appeal is of the utmost importance . . . . ‘The timely filing of a notice of
appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and failure to conform to the applicable time limits
results in forfeiture of an appeal.’”) (citation omitted); Robco Transp., Inc. v. Ritter, 356
N.W.2d 497, 498 (Iowa 1984) (“A timely appeal is jurisdictional, and cannot be conferred
by consent, much less the silence of the appellee.”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Sedgwick
Cnty. v. City of Park City, 260 P.3d 387, 390 (Kan. 2011) (“Kansas appellate courts have
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only if the appeal is taken within the time limitations and
in the manner prescribed by the applicable statutes.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Rice v. Amerling, 433 A.2d 388, 391 (Me. 1981) (“All statutory
requirements for perfecting an appeal are jurisdictional and require strict compliance.”);
Calvert v. Griggs, 992 So. 2d 627, 631 (Miss. 2008) (“A timely-filed notice of appeal is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to invoking this Court’s review.”); In re Marriage of Short, 847
S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“If a notice of appeal is untimely, the appellate court
is without jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.”); Manske v. Manske, 518 N.W.2d 144,
146 (Neb. 1994) (“Timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional necessity and may be raised by
an appellate court sua sponte.”); Sonntag v. Creekside Apartments, 281 P.3d 1220, at *1
(Nev. 2009) (“Since appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we lack jurisdiction to
consider this appeal.”) (table); Schulz v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 589
N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 n.1 (Supreme Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“It is well settled that a party’s failure
to timely file a notice of appeal effectively deprives this court of jurisdiction to entertain his
or her appeal.”); In re H.F., 900 N.E.2d 607, 613 (Ohio 2008) (“[F]ailure to file a timely
notice of appeal . . . is a jurisdictional defect.”); In re Estate of Allen, 960 A.2d 470, 471 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2008) (“[I]f the appeal is late, we have no jurisdiction to entertain it.”); Hood v.
Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984) (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal as
prescribed by Rule 3 of our rules is mandatory and jurisdictional.”); Smith v. Rustic Home
Builders, LLC, 826 N.W.2d 357, 359 (S.D. 2013) (“We have no jurisdiction over an
untimely appeal.”); Wells v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 286, 288
(Va. Ct. App. 2010) (“Timely filing of the notice of appeal at the appellate level is
mandatory and jurisdictional.”); Casella Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Taxes, 869 A.2d 157, 158
(Vt. 2005) (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.”); Yeager
v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241, 247 (Wyo. 2003) (“[F]ailure to timely file a notice of appeal
deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”); see generally 5 AM. JUR. 2D
Appellate Review § 258 (2007); 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE Jurisdiction § 3950.1 (4th ed. 2013); MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR,
FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION & PRACTICE § 6:03 (3d ed. 2013).
54. See, e.g., Richard v. Boggs, 162 P.3d 629, 633 (Alaska 2007); Conn. Commercial
Lenders, LLC v. Teague, 940 A.2d 831, 833 n.5 (Conn. Ct. App. 2008).
55. See, e.g., MONT. R. APP. P. 4(6); Giordano v. Marta, 723 A.2d 833, 837–38 (Del.
1998); Troy Indus., Inc. v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 924 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010);
In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003); Lyman v. Kern, 995 P.2d 504, 506
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Implicit in the timeliness requirement is the requirement that an
appellant be named in a notice of appeal.56 Rule 3(f) provides that “[t]he
notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal . . . .”57
And for joint notices of appeal by multiple appellants represented by the
same counsel, the Rules now permit such collective designations as “all
plaintiffs,” “the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,” and similar conventions.58 Rule 3(f)
thus contemplates that where an action involves multiple rights of appeal,
each appealing party possessing an independent right of appeal must file a
notice of appeal.
For a party to be properly classified as an appellant, the notice of
appeal must somehow expressly identify that party. Notices of appeal filed
on behalf of a non-party or the wrong party are insufficient to perfect an
appeal.59 Consequently, in actions involving the entry of a judgment against
(N.M. Ct. App. 2000); Holbrook v. Poole Assocs., Inc., 400 S.E.2d 863, 866 n.3 (W. Va.
1990).
56. “Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal but is ground only for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.” TENN. R.
APP. P. 3(e). Identifying the party taking an appeal may be construed as part of “the timely
filing of a notice of appeal.”
57. TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f) (emphasis added).
58. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f); TENN. R. APP. P. 16(a). Formerly, the use of “et al.” was
deemed insufficient to satisfy the requirement that each appellant be identified in the notice
of appeal, with the result that any party not specifically listed in the notice was deemed not
to be an appellant. See, e.g., Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2003). Following federal precedent in a manner inconsistent with the ostensible
meaning of Rule 13(a), Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(f) was amended in 2004 to
permit the use of “et al.” and similar conventions in a notice of appeal to refer to multiple
appellants represented by the same counsel. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to
2004 amend. If Rule 13(a) means that only the original appellant needs to file a notice of
appeal, then a rule governing how to identify multiple parties in a notice of appeal would be
superfluous. Even as originally adopted, Rule 3(f) contemplated that a single appeal might
involve multiple appellants, each of which was required to comply with Rule 3: “The notice
of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal . . . .” TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f),
TENN. DECISIONS 577–581 S.W.2d (1979), at XXXIV. The joinder of separate parties in a
single notice of appeal is also governed in part by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure
16(a), which provides that “[i]f two or more persons are entitled to appeal from a judgment
or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may proceed on
appeal jointly.” “Under Rule 16, two or more persons may proceed on appeal jointly. Thus,
it is entirely proper for parties to file a joint notice of appeal; however, a joint notice of
appeal must comply with subparagraph (f) of this rule.” TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n
cmt. to Subdivision (e).
59. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Darocha, 241 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2007) (dismissing appeal where only named appellant was not a party to the lawsuit);
Legens v. Marshall, W2003-00005-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 442903, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 9, 2004) (dismissing appeal where judgment was rendered against a corporation but
only timely named appellant was the corporation’s individual principal). Both Tennessee and
federal appellate courts have held that the failure to name a party in a notice of appeal
constitutes that party’s failure to appeal. See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487
U.S. 312, 314 (1988) (“The failure to name a party in a notice of appeal is more than
excusable ‘informality’; it constitutes a failure of that party to appeal.”), superseded on other
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multiple parties, courts will not presume that all of those parties are
appellants when only one of them files a notice of appeal, even when they
all are represented by the same counsel.60 In our party-driven system, as a
general rule, a party wishing to appeal must take timely action to initiate the
appellate process by filing (independently or jointly) a notice of appeal.61 A
party’s failure to be named in a notice of appeal is tantamount to not filing a
notice at all, and it has the same jurisdictional consequence as an untimely
filing.
In Tennessee, the notice of appeal thus plays a crucial role in civil
actions that is jurisdictional in the strictest sense. Once a trial court’s
exercise of original jurisdiction has concluded with a judgment that triggers
appealability as of right, a party wishing to obtain appellate review of that
judgment as an appellant has a limited time to initiate such review by filing
a notice of appeal expressly identifying that party. Thus, a timely notice of
appeal that adequately identifies the appealing party or parties is the
required procedural mechanism for transferring jurisdiction from the trial
court to the appellate court. Absent a party’s fundamentally proper filing of
a notice of appeal, the appellate court may not exercise appellate
jurisdiction over a judgment entered against that party, and that judgment
grounds by FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(A); M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell, 712 F.3d 666, 668 (2d Cir.
2013) (dismissing appeal by party that was not identified as an appellant in the notice of
appeal); Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 1271, 1274–78 (10th Cir. 2011)
(same), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 779 (U.S. 2011); Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d
832, 844–45 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Maerki v. Wilson, 128 F.3d 1005, 1007–08 (6th Cir.
1997) (same); Billino v. Citibank, N.A., 123 F.3d 723, 726 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] complete
failure to name the party taking the appeal creates a fatal defect . . . . To hold otherwise
would render the requirements of Rule 3 meaningless. Naming the appealing party is a
fundamental purpose of requiring a formal notice of appeal, as it ‘serves both the interests of
finality, in that courts of appeal may not exercise jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the
time for filing a notice of appeal has passed, and of fairness, because the purpose of the
specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is to provide notice both to the opposition and to the
court of the identity of the appellant or appellants.’”) (citations omitted); Mairose v. Fed.
Exp. Corp., 86 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Torres, 487 U.S. at 314),
superseded on other grounds by TENNESSEE RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3(f); see also
20 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL § 304.11[3][b] (3d ed. 1997) (even after the 1993
amendment of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(A) to permit the use of “et al.”
and similar conventions, and despite the requirement that Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3 must be construed liberally, “a complete failure to identify the party taking the
appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction . . . . [A] notice of appeal that does not
indicate, in any way, the clear intention of a party to appeal, still will not confer jurisdiction
on the appellate court.”); TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 53, § 6:02.
60. See, e.g., Town of Carthage, Tenn. v. Smith Cnty., 01-A-01-9308-CH00391, 1995
WL 92266, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1995) (“To be considered an appellant, a party
must file a timely notice of appeal in its own name, or it must be named as an appellant in a
timely joint notice of appeal filed in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 16(a). Parties who do
neither are simply not before the court as appellants.”).
61. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f); TENN. R. APP. P. 16(a); see also MEADOR & BERNSTEIN,
supra note 7, at 69 (discussing party-driven aspect of American appellate system); see infra
note 175 & accompanying text.
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will become permanent under the doctrine of res judicata.62 When it comes
to the vitality of a civil lawsuit, the difference between filing and not filing
a proper notice of appeal is a matter of life or death.
PART II. THE PROBLEM OF SEPARATE
NOTICES OF APPEAL IN TENNESSEE
In Tennessee, the jurisdictional function of notices of appeal must
be viewed in the larger context of Tennessee’s overall structure for
transferring an appeal from the trial court to the appellate court. In adopting
the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Tennessee endorsed policies
of judicial efficiency and procedural simplicity that favor minimizing not
only the number of serial appeals in an action, but also the number of
notices of appeal that need to be filed in relation to the appeal of an action.
Based on these policies, Tennessee is one of a minority of
American jurisdictions that do not require the filing of notices of crossappeal.63 Once a party has timely filed a notice of appeal, an appellee that
seeks to alter or to enlarge the trial court’s judgment may do so without
filing its own notice of appeal but rather simply by asserting those
additional issues in its responsive brief.
Unlike other jurisdictions, however, Tennessee has taken this
approach a step further: Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a)
expressly provides that “separate appeals” are unnecessary.64 Setting aside
cross-appeals, which are by definition derivative, a separate-appeal scenario
typically arises when multiple parties occupying the same posture in the
trial court respectively possess independent rights of appeal. A separateappeal scenario comes about, for example, when a final judgment is entered
in favor of a plaintiff against two separate defendants, each of which is thus
confronted with a limited time period for perfecting its appeal by filing
(independently or jointly) a notice of appeal.
Although, as discussed above, Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a) make the timely filing of a notice of appeal
both mandatory and jurisdictional for all putative appellants, Rule 13(a)’s
62. See Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (stating that res judicata
is a “rule of rest” that “promotes finality in litigation, prevents inconsistent or contradictory
judgments, conserves judicial resources, and protects litigants from the cost and vexation of
multiple lawsuits”) (citations omitted); see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 398–402 (1981) (discussing res judicata in relation to a party’s failure to assert a
separate appeal).
63. See, e.g., IND. R. APP. P. 9(D); NEB. CT. R. § 2-101(E); Key Risk Ins. Co. v.
Crews, 727 S.E.2d 436, 442 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
64. Rule 13(a) states in full: “(a) Questions of Law that May Be Urged Upon
Appeal. Except as otherwise provided in Rule 3(e), any question of law may be brought up
for review and relief by any party. Cross-appeals, separate appeals, and separate applications
for permission to appeal are not required. Dismissal of the original appeal shall not preclude
issues raised by another party from being considered by an appellate court.” TENN. R. APP. P.
13(a).
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exception for separate appeals other than cross-appeals directly contradicts
this general jurisdictional requirement. This discrepancy, which is
imbedded within Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, has yielded
two conflicting lines of judicial authority regarding the failure to file a
separate notice of appeal: one line of authority, relying solely on Rules 3(e),
3(f), and 4(a), dismisses a separate appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction
when a separate notice of appeal has not been filed; by contrast, another
line of authority, relying solely on Rule 13(a), exercises appellate
jurisdiction and does not dismiss a separate appeal when a separate notice
of appeal has not been filed. This split of authority yields two opposing
results arising from a single procedural circumstance. Such a result is
unfair, is inconsistent with the simplicity and coherence that Tennessee’s
Rules of Appellate Procedure are intended to embody, and fails to provide
reliable guidance to litigants.
A. Tennessee’s Singular Structure for Filing Notices of Appeal
Tennessee has adopted an appellate procedural structure that is
designed to minimize not only serial appeals in a single action, but also the
overall number of notices that must be filed in relation to a particular
appeal. In line with this emphasis on procedural simplicity, Tennessee not
only has chosen not to require the filing of notices of cross-appeal, but also
has provided that separate notices of appeal need not be filed.
1. Tennessee Does Not Require Notices of Cross-Appeal
Unlike most jurisdictions, Tennessee does not require the filing of
notices of cross-appeal.65 A “cross-appeal” arises when an appellee, in
response to an appeal previously filed by another party, asserts its own right
to seek alteration or enlargement of the judgment relating to that
appellant.66 In Tennessee an appellee may advance its own issues on
65. See TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a) (“Cross-appeals, separate appeals, and separate
applications for permission to appeal are not required.”) (emphasis added); Cantrell v.
Carrier Corp., 193 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tenn. 2006) (“When a party to a lawsuit properly
perfects an appeal, the appellee need not file a separate notice of appeal [i.e., a cross-appeal]
to obtain review of additional issues and may raise additional issues in its responsive
brief.”); Flautt & Mann v. Council of City of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 867 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that notice of cross-appeal need not be filed by appellant for appellant
to raise appellate issues of its own); Jahn v. Jahn, 932 S.W.2d 939, 941 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996) (“The appellant argues that we cannot consider the appellee’s issues because he did
not file a notice of appeal. The appellant’s position is incorrect. Once a case is properly
appealed by one party, the other party or parties are at liberty to raise issues.”); Henderson v.
Mabry, 838 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“It is the intention of [Tennessee Rule
of Appellate Procedure 13(a)] that only one notice of appeal be filed and that the right of
cross-appeal shall exist without notice of cross-appeal.”) (citation omitted).
66. “Cross-appeal” is defined as “[a]n appeal by the appellee, usu[ally] heard at the
same time as the appellant’s appeal.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (9th ed. 2009); see
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appeal—including seeking to alter or enlarge the judgment entered below—
simply by asserting those issues in its responsive brief.67
By contrast, federal courts require an appellee that wishes to alter
or to enlarge (rather than merely to affirm) the judgment below to file its
own notice of cross-appeal after an original notice of appeal has been
filed.68 Through this requirement, as well as by requiring the filing of
separate notices of appeal based on multiple, independent rights of appeal,
federal appellate courts ensure that from the inception of an appeal the
appellate court, the appellate court clerk’s office, and the litigants have

also 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 21 (2007) (“A ‘cross appeal’ is an appeal by an appellee
who seeks something more than was received in the trial court.”); 20 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE–CIVIL § 304.11[3][b] (3d ed. 1997) (“A party against whom an appeal is taken
may file a notice of appeal to challenge the order or judgment, which is commonly referred
to as a notice of cross-appeal.”); TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 53, § 6:10 (“The cross-appeal is
not a device to confer jurisdiction where it does not already exist.”); see also infra notes 79–
84 & accompanying text.
67. See TENN. R. APP. P. 27(b) (“If appellee is also requesting relief from the
judgment, the brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and arguments involved in his
request for relief as well as the answer to the brief of appellant.”); see also TENN. R. APP. P.
13(a) (stating that “[c]ross appeals . . . are not required.”); Cantrell, 193 S.W.3d at 471;
Flautt & Mann, 285 S.W.3d at 867; Quebecor Printing Corp. v. L & B Mfg. Co., 209
S.W.3d 565, 582–83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Henderson, 838 S.W.2d at 541; PIVNICK, supra
note 2, § 30:7. The Rules indicate that a cross-appellant, despite not having filed a notice of
cross-appeal, may advance its cross-appeal notwithstanding dismissal of the appellant’s
appeal. See TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a) (“Dismissal of the original appeal shall not preclude [the
appeal of] another party from being considered by an appellate court.”); see also Edwards v.
Hunt, 635 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (“The first question for decision is
whether the party filing a notice of appeal is able to later terminate all counter appeals by
dismissing his notice of appeal. We hold that he cannot.”); see infra notes 133–134 &
accompanying text.
68. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed,
or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”);
FED. R. APP. P. 28.1 (describing the procedure concerning cross-appeals); El Paso Natural
Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479 (1999) (“Absent a cross-appeal, an appellee may
‘urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may
involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court,’ but may not ‘attack the decree with
a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his
adversary.’”) (citation omitted); see also WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7; 2A FED. PROC.,
L. ED. § 3:611 (2013); TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 53, § 6:10; 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate
Review § 295 (2007). Federal circuits are split over the question whether the failure to file a
notice of cross-appeal is a jurisdictional defect. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237,
245 (2008); WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7; DAVID G. KNIBB, FED. CT. APP. MANUAL
§§ 11:2, 11:4 (6th ed. 2013). Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to
decide this question, labeling it merely “theoretical,” Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 245, the Court
has reinforced the characterization of the cross-appeal requirement as mandatory. The crossappeal rule is described as “inveterate and certain,” id. (citation omitted), and “in more than
two centuries of repeatedly endorsing the cross-appeal requirement, not a single one of [the
Supreme Court’s] holdings has ever recognized an exception to the rule.” El Paso Natural
Gas, 526 U.S. at 480. Consequently, practitioners might as well treat the rule as if it were
jurisdictional. See WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7.
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notice of all rights of appeal being asserted within an action.69 Most states
fall in line with this federal appellate procedure, requiring or at least
providing for the filing of notices of cross-appeal when an appellee wants to
alter or to enlarge the judgment entered below.70 Only a handful of
jurisdictions in addition to Tennessee do not require or contemplate the
filing of notices of cross-appeal.71
Not requiring the filing of a notice of cross-appeal—which by
definition is a derivative appeal that is dependent on and responsive to an
appeal previously asserted by an opposing party—is an understandable
exception to the general requirement that each party wishing to appeal must
file its own notice of appeal.72 A party that is largely satisfied with the trial
court’s judgment may choose not to file an original or separate appeal, but
that party may seek to alter or to enlarge some portion of the judgment
should it be drawn into an appeal as an appellee. A cross-appeal is thus
asserted by a party, and regarding a judgment, over which the appellate
court necessarily already exercises appellate jurisdiction; the appellate court
already has the power to reverse or to modify the judgment in favor of the
appellee, and thus the appellee’s raising of its own issues arguably does not
fall outside the appellate jurisdiction already being exercised. “The cross-

69. See Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53 (“[I]f the Government files a cross-appeal, the
defendant will have fair warning, well in advance of briefing and argument, that pursuit of
his appeal exposes him to the risk of a higher sentence.”); El Paso Natural Gas, 526 U.S. at
481–82 (“[The] cross-appeal requirement . . . is not there to penalize parties who fail to
assert their rights, but is meant to protect institutional interests in the orderly functioning of
the judicial system, by putting opposing parties and appellate courts on notice of the issues
to be litigated and encouraging repose of those that are not.”).
70. See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 204(a)(2); COLO. APP. R. 4(a); FLA. R. APP. P.
9.110(g); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-38 (2013); HAW. R. APP. P. 4.1; IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101(2);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2103(h) (2013); KY. R. CIV. P. 72.06(2); MASS. R. APP. P. 4(a);
MINN. R. APP. P. 103.02(2); MISS. R. APP. P. 4(c); MO. SUP. CT. R. 81.04(c); NEV. R. APP. P.
4(a)(2); N.D. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2); PA. R. APP. P. 903(b); VT. R. APP. P. 4(a); WISC. STAT. ANN.
§ 809.10(2)(b); WYO. R. APP. P. 2.01(a)(2); Beaty v. Head Springs Cemetery Ass’n, 413 So.
2d 1126, 1128 (Ala. 1982); Tempe Corporate Office Bldg. v. Ariz. Funding Servs., Inc., 807
P.2d 1130, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Hasha v. City of Fayetteville, 845 S.W.2d 500, 504
(Ark. 1993); Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 86 Cal. App. 4th 422, 437, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305
(2001); 190 Elm St. Realty, LLC v. Beaudoin, 855 A.2d 546, 548 (N.H. 2004); Powers v.
Miller, 984 P.2d 177, 183–84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Kaplysh v. Takieddine, 519 N.E.2d
382, 386–87 (Ohio 1988); Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). See generally 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 21 (2007). The question whether
states treat the failure to file a notice of cross-appeal as a jurisdictional defect lies outside the
scope of this Article.
71. See, e.g., IND. R. APP. P. 9(D); NEB. CT. R. § 2-101(E); Key Risk Ins. Co. v.
Crews, 727 S.E.2d 436, 442 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
72. See, e.g., Town of Carthage, Tenn. v. Smith Cnty., 01-A-01-9308-CH00391, 1995
WL 92266, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1995) (“To be considered an appellant, a party
must file a timely notice of appeal in its own name, or it must be named as an appellant in a
timely joint notice of appeal filed in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 16(a). Parties who do
neither are simply not before the court as appellants.”).

40

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 17

appeal is not a device to confer jurisdiction where it does not already
exist.”73
Although not requiring the filing of notices of cross-appeal departs
from and is technically inconsistent with the general notice-of-appeal
requirements mandated by Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and
4, that departure has not engendered the kind of judicial split of authority
caused by Rule 13(a) with respect to separate appeals other than crossappeals. Though the better and more consistent practice both in
jurisdictional and administrative terms may be to require the filing of
notices of cross-appeal, as is done in federal courts, Tennessee’s practice of
not requiring it works reasonably well.74
Tennessee’s rationale for not requiring notices of cross-appeal
primarily has to do with simplifying the appellate process. With respect to
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e), the Advisory Commission has
emphasized this policy in favor of simplicity: “The intent of this
subdivision is to provide a uniform and simplified method of taking an
appeal as of right.”75 In line with this attempt at simplification, Tennessee
has, for the most part, rejected the use of the notice of appeal as a means for
limiting the scope of the issues that may be raised on appeal.76
73. TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 53, § 6:10; see supra note 66.
74. Under federal appellate procedure, multiple appeals (both cross-appeals and
separate appeals in a narrower sense) within an action are handled by requiring each party
asserting a right of appeal (whether derivative or independent) to file a timely notice of
appeal: “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of
appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time
otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3).
This rule not only ensures that, from the inception of an appeal, the appellate court, the
appellate court clerk’s office, and the litigants receive notice of every right of appeal
(whether derivative or independent) being asserted within an action, but it also permits
putative cross-appellants and separate appellants to wait until another party has filed an
original appeal before determining whether to assert their cross-appeals or other separate
appeals. See WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7; MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59,
§ 304.11[3][a]. The federal procedure thus does an arguably better job than Tennessee in
clarifying from the outset the contours of the respective rights of appeal being asserted by
multiple parties, which may make it easier to set briefing schedules and the sequence of oral
argument for appeals involving the assertion of multiple rights of appeal. See infra Section
IV(B).
75. TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (e); see Johnson v.
Hardin, 926 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tenn. 1996) (“Prior to July 1, 1979, practice and procedure in
Tennessee appellate courts were governed by scattered statutory provisions and by the rules
and decisions of the appellate courts.”); John L. Sobieski, Jr., The Theoretical Foundations
of the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, 45 TENN. L. REV. 161, 166–70,
183–87 (1978) [hereinafter Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations] (stating that a “primary
purpose of the [Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure] is simplification of the law,” which
included compiling the formerly scattered statutes and judicial rulings on appellate
procedure and transforming and revising them into a single, coherent set of rules).
76. TENN. R. APP. P. 13 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a) (“[T]his subdivision
rejects use of the notice of appeal as a review-limiting device.”); Cox v. Tenn. Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co., 297 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); In re NHC–Nashville Fire Litig., 293
S.W.3d 547, 559–60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); see infra Section IV(A).
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2. Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a), Tennessee Does
Not Require Notices of Separate Appeal
Tennessee has gone a step further. In addition to not requiring the
filing of notices of cross-appeal, Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure
manifest an even deeper attempt at simplification: As a general rule, with
respect to appeals within a single action, Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 13(a) ostensibly provides that only a single notice of appeal ever
needs to be filed.77 Rule 13(a) states that “[c]ross-appeals, separate appeals,
and separate applications for permission to appeal are not required.”78
Because the Rules do not define “separate appeals,” we must do so
here. Defined most broadly, “separate appeals” are appeals asserted by two
or more parties, each of which possesses a right of appeal. Appeals asserted
in separate lawsuits constitute separate appeals.79
When limited to a single lawsuit, “separate appeal” means the right
of appeal that may be asserted by any party other than the original
appellant. Cross-appeals fall under this definition. Even a lawsuit involving,
for example, only a single appellant and a single appellee potentially
involves a separate appeal, for an appellee with something to complain
about potentially possesses a right of cross-appeal that is “separate” from
the appellant’s appeal.80 Should the appellant dismiss its appeal, the
77. See Henderson v. Mabry, 838 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“It is the
intention of this rule [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a)] that only one notice of
appeal be filed and that the right of cross-appeal shall exist without notice of cross-appeal.”);
Edwards v. Hunt, 635 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (“It was the intention of Rule
13 TRAP that only one notice of appeal be filed and that the right of cross appeal shall exist
without a notice of cross appeal.”); see also State v. Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 3 n.1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1996) (“The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure contemplate the filing of
only one notice of appeal.”); John L. Sobieski, Jr., The Procedural Details of the Proposed
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, 46 TENN. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1978) [hereinafter
Sobieski, Procedural Details] (“[P]arties other than the initial appellant do not need to file
their own notices of appeal to obtain appellate review and relief.”).
78. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a) (emphasis added). Comments to Rule 3(f) state that “[t]his
subdivision read in conjunction with Rule 13(a) permits any question of law to be brought
up for review [except as otherwise provided by Rule 3(a)] as long as any party formally
declares an intention to appeal in a timely fashion.” TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n
cmt. to Subdivision (f). This Comment does not, however, expressly address the question of
separate appeals, and it has not been interpreted as addressing the conflict addressed by this
Article. Comments to Rule 5(c) similarly state that, “once one party files a notice of appeal,
other parties are not required to file a separate notice of appeal in order to raise any issue(s)
in the appeal.” TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to 2012 amend. This Comment also
does not address the conflict at issue. See infra Section III(B).
79. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 16(b) uses this meaning when it provides
that “[w]hen separate appeals involving a common question of law or common facts are
pending before the appellate court, the appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate
court on its own motion or on motion of a party.”
80. See supra notes 66 (defining cross-appeal), 74 & accompanying text; see also
Cantrell v. Carrier Corp., 193 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tenn. 2006) (referring to a cross-appeal as a
“separate appeal”); State v. Russell, 800 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tenn. 1990) (same); Harrell v.
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appellee would retain the right to go forward with its cross-appeal:
“Dismissal of the original appeal shall not preclude issues raised by another
party from being considered by an appellate court.”81 Nevertheless, as
discussed above, cross-appeals remain a derivative category of appeal
because they are, by definition, necessarily responsive to and dependent on
an opposing party’s prior appeal. Cross-appeals are also necessarily
asserted by parties, and regarding judgments, over which the appellate court
already exercises appellate jurisdiction by virtue of the prior appeal.
When cross-appeals are excluded from the definition of “separate
appeals,” as Rule 13(a) does by expressly referring additionally to “crossappeals,” a separate appeal within a single lawsuit means an appeal asserted
by any party, other than the original appellant, that possesses an
independent (as opposed to derivative) right of appeal.82 In other words,
separate rights of appeal arise in an action when two or more parties each
possess a right of appeal other than a right of cross-appeal. In this sense, a
separate appeal is something other than an original appeal or a cross-appeal.
Insofar as a cross-appeal is defined as an appeal asserted derivatively by an
appellee against an appellant, an appeal asserted by an appellee against a
party that never appealed involves an independent right of separate appeal.
Unlike cross-appeals, separate appeals in this narrower sense can involve
putative appellants over whom the appellate court does not necessarily
already exercise appellate jurisdiction by virtue of an original appeal.83
This narrowed definition of separate appeals applies to multi-party
actions involving more than just a single appellant and a single appellee.84
“[I]f numerous parties aligned together in the lower court file individual
appeals, all but the first are known as separate appeals. Once one party has
filed a notice of appeal, other parties who have not joined in that initial
notice of appeal must file their own notices of appeal if they wish to attack
all or a portion of the judgment below and to be relieved of the
Harrell, 321 S.W.3d 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (referring to a notice of cross-appeal as a
“separate notice of appeal”).
81. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a). The Rules thus indicate that a cross-appellant, despite not
having filed a notice of cross-appeal, may advance its cross-appeal notwithstanding
dismissal of the appellant’s appeal. See Edwards, 635 S.W.2d at 698 (“The first question for
decision is whether the party filing a notice of appeal is able to later terminate all counter
appeals by dismissing his notice of appeal. We hold that he cannot.”); see also Russell, 800
S.W.2d at 171; infra note 128 & accompanying text. To permit an original appellant to
cancel a cross-appeal by dismissing its appeal would unfairly permit a party to gain an unfair
procedural advantage by being the first to file a notice of appeal. Such a consequence would
undermine the viability of not requiring the filing of notices of cross-appeal.
82. See WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7; see also supra note 66 (defining crossappeal).
83. See WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7.
84. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 243 (2007) (“In multiparty actions, each party may be
required to appeal to protect one’s separate interest. . . . A party may not appeal the claim of
another party. Parties who are separately aggrieved may separately appeal.”); see also
WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7.
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consequences thereof. The fact that one party has taken a timely appeal
does not permit the appellee or any other party (even though aligned in the
district court with the first appellant) to seek to have the judgment below
overturned or modified in some respect.”85 Although separate appeals arise
most often where multiple parties occupy the same procedural posture in
the trial court (e.g., five plaintiffs), they are not limited to such
circumstances. Separate appeals can arise even where the separate
appellants do not all occupy the same posture in the trial court (e.g., a
plaintiff and a third-party defendant may have separate, independent rights
of appeal that do not implicate cross-appeals between the plaintiff and
third-party defendant or otherwise).
Some examples and diagrams illustrate the definition. For instance,
consider an action in which three separate plaintiffs seek to appeal from a
judgment in favor of a single defendant.
Plaintiff 1
Plaintiff 2

Defendant

Plaintiff 3
Figure 1

In Figure 1, the arrows represent the rights of appeal possessed respectively
by each of the three plaintiffs. It may not be presumed that all three of the
plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel or have shared interests in the
lawsuit.86 Under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 alone, for
each of these three plaintiffs to perfect an appeal each must file its own
separate notice of appeal or must expressly join in a notice of appeal filed
by one of the other two plaintiffs.87 Under Rules 3 and 4, and under the
appellate procedures of all jurisdictions other than Tennessee, a plaintiff in
such a situation that does neither is, as a general rule, simply not an
appellant and may not seek appellate review of the trial court’s judgment.88
Another, more complex example involves third-party practice.
Suppose that a single plaintiff obtains a final judgment against a single
85. See WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7.
86. Whether these three parties are all represented by the same counsel does not affect
the requirement under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 that each appellant
must file a notice of appeal. By permitting “an attorney representing more than one party” to
describe them in a notice of appeal by using “all plaintiffs,” “et al.,” and similar conventions,
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(f) does not restrict the existence of separate
appeals to instances where the separate appellants are represented by separate counsel. In
other words, the use of “et al.” and other conventions is simply a means for encompassing
separate appeals within a single notice of appeal where multiple appellants happen to be
represented by the same counsel. See supra note 58.
87. TENN. R. APP. P. 3; TENN. R. APP. P. 4.
88. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 243 (2007); WRIGHT, supra note 53.
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defendant, and suppose that the single defendant, in its capacity as a thirdparty plaintiff, obtains a final judgment against a third-party defendant,
which is a separate party from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff

Third-Party Defendant
Figure 2

In this example, represented by Figure 2, the defendant/third-party plaintiff
has a right of appeal (represented by an arrow) from the judgment against it
in favor of the plaintiff, and the third-party defendant has a right of appeal
(represented by an arrow) from the judgment against it in favor of the
defendant/third-party plaintiff. Neither of these two rights of appeal
qualifies as a cross-appeal, and the two rights of appeal are separate from
and independent of each other. Accordingly, under Rules 3 and 4 alone, to
perfect an appeal, the defendant/third-party plaintiff and the third-party
defendant would each have to file (either independently or jointly) a notice
of appeal. Given the adversity between those parties, the filing of a joint
notice would be unlikely and perhaps even prohibited.
But as discussed above, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure
13(a) expressly provides that “separate appeals” are unnecessary: “Crossappeals, separate appeals, and separate applications for permission to
appeal are not required.” This sentence has been part of Rule 13(a) since
Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure were first adopted effective
July 1, 1979.89 According to the language of Rule 13(a), in the examples
represented graphically above, only the original appellant (i.e., the first of
the appellants to appeal) would be required to file a notice of appeal. The
remaining appellants could assert separate appeals (i.e., appeals other than
an original appeal or a cross-appeal) without filing either independently or
jointly any notice of appeal. The remaining appellants could instead rely
implicitly on the original appellant’s notice of appeal to perfect their own
separate appeals and thus avail themselves of appellate jurisdiction.90

89. See TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a), TENN. DECISIONS 577–581 S.W.2d (1979), at LV
(providing text of proposed Rule 13 in context of proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure); see also TENN. R. SUP. CT. 1 (stating that the Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure took effect on July 1, 1979); TENN. R. APP. P. 49 (stating that effective date of
Rules is July 1, 1979). For background regarding the drafting and original adoption of
Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations, supra
note 75; Sobieski, Procedural Details, supra note 77.
90. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a); see infra Section IV(A).
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3. Historical Background to the Adoption of Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 13(a)
Historical background to the adoption of Tennessee’s Rules of
Appellate Procedure in 1979 illuminates the two main reasons for adopting
Rule 13(a). First, as explained by the Reporter to the Tennessee Supreme
Court Advisory Commission on Civil Rules in 1978–79, Rule 13(a)
represented Tennessee’s “rejection of the use of the notice of appeal as a
review-limiting device” as provided under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(c), which requires that a notice of appeal specify the
“judgment, order, or part thereof” being appealed.91 This rationale supports
primarily the first sentence of Rule 13(a), which provides that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in Rule 3(e), any question of law may be brought up for
review and relief by any party.”92 Second, Tennessee expressly rejected as
unnecessary and unduly complex the federal requirement that appellees
must file notices of cross-appeal to be eligible to alter or to enlarge the
judgment on appeal.93 This rationale supports Rule 13(a)’s provision that
“[c]ross-appeals . . . are not required.”94 As the Reporter explained, “The
proposed Tennessee Rules reject both of the review-limiting aspects of the
notice of appeal that have arisen in the federal system.”95
91. Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations, supra note 75, at 188; see TENN. R. APP. P. 13
advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a) (“[T]his subdivision rejects use of the notice of
appeal as a review-limiting device. In federal practice the notice of appeal has limited review
in two principal ways. Some courts have limited the questions an appellant may urge on
review to those affecting the portion of the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.
However, since the principal utility of the notice of appeal is simply to indicate a party’s
intention to take an appeal, this limitation seems undesirable. The federal courts have also
limited the issues an appellee may raise on appeal in the absence of the appellee’s own
notice of appeal. Here again, since neither the issues presented for review nor the arguments
in support of those issues are set forth in the notice of appeal, there seems to be no good
reason for so limiting the questions an appellee may urge on review. The result of
eliminating any requirement that an appellee file the appellee’s own notice of appeal is that
once any party files a notice of appeal the appellate court may consider the case as a
whole.”).
92. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a).
93. Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations, supra note 75, at 189–92; see TENN. R. APP. P.
13 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a), quoted in full, supra note 91. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3) regarding “Multiple Appeals” provides that “[i]f one party
timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days
after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this
Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.” This provision has, in substance, been part of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure since they were first adopted in 1968. See Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure with Conforming Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 61, 69, 127 (1968); WRIGHT,
supra note 53.
94. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a).
95. Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations, supra note 75, at 190. “The proposed rules
differ significantly from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, although some rules are
modeled after the federal rules.” Id. at 181.
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The justification for not requiring notices of separate appeal,
however, is harder to discern. In discussing the reasons for adopting Rule
13(a), the Reporter focuses on simple cross-appeal scenarios both without
explaining the intended effect of Rule 13(a) on separate-appeal scenarios
involving multiple, independent rights of appeal and without explaining
how Rule 13(a) may be reconciled with Rules 3 and 4.96 Although the
Reporter later takes the position that “[f]or reasons explored at length
elsewhere, parties other than the initial appellant do not need to file their
own notices of appeal to obtain appellate review and relief,”97 the Reporter
still neither explains the intended effect of Rule 13(a) on separate-appeal
scenarios other than cross-appeals nor addresses how Rule 13(a) may be
reconciled with Rules 3 and 4.98 The Reporter acknowledges the occasional
need for the filing of multiple notices of appeal, stating that “[i]n cases
involving more than a single plaintiff and a single defendant, proposed Rule
16(a) permits two or more persons to proceed as a single appellant and file
a joint notice of appeal, a joint brief, and the like, if their interests make
joinder practicable.”99 But the relationship of Rules 13(a) and 16(a) with the
mandatory and jurisdictional notice-of-appeal requirements of Rules 3 and
4 remains unexplained for separate appellants whose adverse interests make
joinder impracticable.100 Insofar as it is suggested that parties with adverse
interests “may take separate appeals,” thus indicating that multiple notices
of appeal may need to be filed within a single action, the relationship
between Rule 13(a) and Rules 3 and 4 with respect to separate appeals is
not clarified.101 Moreover, the Reporter approvingly cites commentators
recommending that an appellate court be given the power to modify a
“judgment in favor of any nonappealing party even if that party has not
participated at all in the appeal.” Yet this principle also is not reconciled
with the jurisdictional mandate of Rules 3 and 4.102
96. See id. at 187–94.
97. Sobieski, Procedural Details, supra note 77, at 13–14 (emphasis added).
98. Id. (cross-referencing Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations, supra note 75 at 187–
92); cf. TENN. R. APP. P. 13 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a) (“The result of
eliminating any requirement that an appellee file the appellee’s own notice of appeal is that
once any party files a notice of appeal the appellate court may consider the case as a
whole.”).
99. Sobieski, Procedural Details, supra note 77, at 14.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. (citing commentators). One of these authorities, Wright and Miller’s
treatise on federal procedure, continues to take the position, contrary to federal judicial
authority, that “[i]t is better to recognize power to modify a judgment in favor of a
nonappealing party” and criticizes both the jurisdictionality of notices of appeal and the
requirement of filing notices of cross-appeal. See WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3904. But see
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 254 (2008) (“The strict time limits on notices of
appeal and cross-appeal would be undermined, in both civil and criminal cases, if an appeals
court could modify a judgment in favor of a party who filed no notice of appeal.”); El Paso
Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479–81 (1999).
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The resulting Advisory Commission Comment to Rule 13(a) states
that “[t]he result of eliminating any requirement that an appellee file the
appellee’s own notice of appeal is that once any party files a notice of
appeal the appellate court may consider the case as a whole,” thus
indicating that notices of cross-appeal asserted by appellees are
unnecessary, but it does not expressly address the issue of separate appeals.
In sum, the rationale for not requiring notices of separate appeal has been
murky since Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure were first adopted
in 1979.
4. The Uniqueness of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a)
Comparison of Rule 13(a) with rules of appellate procedure in other
jurisdictions throughout the country indicates that Tennessee is the only
jurisdiction in the United States that has expressly provided by rule that
“separate appeals” (that is to say, separate notices of appeal) are not
required.103 As discussed below, Tennessee’s judicial split of authority
regarding the effect of Rule 13(a) probably arises in part from its sheer
eccentricity.
B. Tennessee’s Judicial Split of Authority Regarding Whether Separate
Notices of Appeal Are Required
When it comes to handling the failure to file a notice of appeal in
separate-appeal scenarios, Tennessee appellate courts have sometimes—but
not always—read Rule 13(a) as providing an exception to Rules 3(e), 3(f),
and 4(a). Consequently, two inconsistent lines of authority have arisen: one
line follows Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), dismissing attempted separate
appeals where no separate notice of appeal has been filed or joined; and the
other line follows Rule 13(a), permitting separate appeals despite the fact
that no separate notice of appeal has been filed or joined. It is instructive to
contrast these two lines of cases.
On the one hand, a leading example of cases following Rules 3 and
4 that reject separate appeals where no separate notice of appeal has been
filed is Spectra Plastics, Inc. v. Nashoba Bank.104 In Spectra, a lenderliability action, two separate plaintiffs—Spectra Plastics and J. Goodman
103. See TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a). The only other jurisdiction with a similar rule is
Georgia, which provides by statute that “[a]ll parties to the proceedings in the lower court
shall be parties on appeal and shall be served with a copy of the notice of appeal in the
manner prescribed by Code Section 5-6-32.” GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-37 (2013). This statute,
which does not expressly address the question of separate appeals and which could
potentially be read narrowly as merely providing that the appellate court may render a
judgment affecting any party to the action below, nonetheless has been construed by a few
courts as obviating the need for a separate notice of appeal. See, e.g., Marsden v. Se. Sash &
Door Co., 388 S.E.2d 730, 731 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
104. 15 S.W.3d 832 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
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Associates—sought to appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor
of the sole defendant, Nashoba Bank.105 In Figure 3, which depicts the
separate-appeal scenario in Spectra, each arrow represents a separate,
independent right of appeal.
Plaintiff Spectra Plastics, Inc.
Defendant Nashoba Bank
Plaintiff J. Goodman Assocs.
Figure 3

The two plaintiffs filed a joint appellants’ brief.106 The Court of
Appeals determined, however, that only Spectra Plastics was properly
before the Court of Appeals because “the only notice of appeal that was
filed in this case . . . expressly identified Spectra as an appealing party, and
did not declare [J. Goodman Associates’] intention to appeal in any
manner.”107 Relying on Rule 3(f), the Court of Appeals concluded that J.
Goodman Associates had simply failed to perfect an appeal, and the
appellate court declined to address any matters relating to J. Goodman
Associates, effectively rendering permanent the trial court’s judgment as to
that party.108 In so holding, the Court of Appeals never addressed Rule
13(a). Other cases, often similarly focusing on Rules 3(f) and 4(a) to the
exclusion of Rule 13(a), have reached conclusions consistent with
Spectra.109
105. Id. at 840.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., McGaugh v. Galbreath, 996 S.W.2d 186, 189–90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)
(the Court of Appeals, citing Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(f) and 4(a), in case
involving two defendants/counter-plaintiffs/cross-plaintiffs who sought to appeal, held that
the failure of one of them to be named in a notice of appeal was fatal to that party’s appeal);
Barbee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., W2003-00017-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 239763 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Feb. 9, 2004) (in case involving appeal by three plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal by one plaintiff (named Dillard) because he “did not file a notice of
appeal. Accordingly, Dillard is dismissed as an appellant in this case. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f),
4(a).”); Town of Carthage, Tenn. v. Smith Cnty., 01-A-01-9308-CH00391, 1995 WL 92266,
at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1995) (in case involving six plaintiffs/appellants, only two
of which were named in the notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the four who
were not named in the notice of appeal were not before the Court of Appeals as appellants);
State v. City of Murfreesboro, 01-A-01-9404-CH00195, 1994 WL 585678, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 26, 1994) (in case involving three plaintiffs/appellants, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeals of two of them for failure to be named in a notice of appeal, reasoning
that “there is no provision [in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure] permitting one of
two plaintiffs who join their separate suits in a single action to appeal the dismissal of both
suits without the joinder of both plaintiffs in the notice of appeal and appeal bond”); see also
Mairose v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 86 S.W.3d 502, 508–09 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing
appeal of eight appellants based on Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(f) and 4(a)
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On the other hand, a leading example of cases following Rule 13(a)
by permitting a separate appeal notwithstanding the separate appellant’s
failure to file its own notice of appeal is Bryant v. Gill.110 In Bryant, a threecar auto-accident case, two plaintiffs, Felicia Bryant and Robert Giden,
sued three defendants: John Gill, the driver of a truck, and Pravien Patel
and Pramudhbhai Patel, respectively the driver and passenger of a jeep.111
The Patels cross-claimed against co-defendant Gill.112 The trial court
granted summary judgment, denying the plaintiffs’ claims against all three
defendants and also denying the Patels’ cross-claims against Gill.113 In
Figure 4, the arrows originating with plaintiffs Bryant and Giden represent
their respective separate rights of appeal against all three defendants, and
the arrows originating with the Patels represent their respective separate
rights of appeal (arising from their cross-claims) against defendant/crossdefendant Gill.
Plaintiff Felicia Bryant

Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff
Pravien Patel

Plaintiff Robert Giden

Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff
Pramudhbhai Patel

Defendant/Cross-Defendant
John Gill
Figure 4

On appeal, both the plaintiffs (Bryant and Giden) and the Patels
made arguments for reversal, but only the plaintiffs had filed a notice of
appeal.114 Though the Patels’ appeals with respect to Gill arose from their
cross-claims against him as co-defendant, the appeals by the Patels against
Gill involved independent rights of appeal, not cross-appeals.
Defendant/cross-defendant Gill argued that the Patels’ “failure to file a
notice of appeal bars their appeal from the judgment on their Crossclaim.”115 The Court of Appeals, quoting Tennessee Rule of Appellate
because they had not been specifically named in the notice of appeal (before amendment of
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(f) to permit use of “et al.”)); Croslin v. Croslin,
01A01-9607-CV-00297, 1997 WL 44394, at *6 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1997) (holding
that although there were two respondents in the trial court, only one of them appealed, and
therefore the other respondent was “not before this Court [of Appeals] and this Court has no
jurisdiction insofar as she is concerned.”).
110. 02A01-9311-CV-00259, 1994 WL 709021 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1994).
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Procedure 13(a) and its Comments, disagreed, holding that the Patels were
properly appellants despite their failure to file a notice of appeal:
Cross-appeals, separate appeals, and separate applications
for permission to appeal are not required. The Advisory
Commission Comments note that this rule rejects use of the
notice of appeal as a review-limiting device. Further, once
any party files a notice of appeal the appellate court may
consider the case as a whole. Because Plaintiffs filed a
timely notice of appeal, we may consider the Patels’ Crossclaim as a part of the case as a whole.116
The Court of Appeals in Bryant, making no reference to Rules 3(f)
or 4(a), thus permitted separate appellants possessing independent rights of
appeal to seek and to obtain reversal of a judgment below without their
having filed (either independently or jointly) any notice of appeal.117 In
effect, the Court of Appeals permitted these parties to assert a separate
appeal other than a cross-appeal—and to obtain appellate jurisdiction—by
relying on a notice of appeal filed by another party and counsel with
adverse interests. Other cases, focusing on Rule 13(a) to the exclusion of
Rules 3(f) and 4(a), have reached conclusions consistent with Bryant.118
116. Id. (quoting TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a) & advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at *3.
118. See, e.g., Gray v. Boyle Inv. Co., 803 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)
(permitting two plaintiffs/appellees to raise issues on appeal against four defendants who
never appealed (and thus never became appellants) because a separate fifth defendant had
filed a notice of appeal, holding that Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a) permitted
the Court of Appeals to consider the case as a whole so long as any party files a notice of
appeal); Studsvik, Inc. v. Bull Run Metal Fabricators & Eng’rs, Inc., E2010-01696-COAR3-CV (order entered Nov. 17, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss appeal by Bull Run Metal
Fabricators and Engineers, Inc., one of two separate appellants, despite the fact that Bull Run
filed no notice of appeal, holding that Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a) did not
require the filing of a separate notice of appeal); In re Adoption of D.P.E., E2005-02865COA-R3PT, 2006 WL 2417578, at *32 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2006) (permitting, based
on Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a), a defendant (DCS) that filed appellate brief
but no notice of appeal to attack the trial court’s judgment on appeal because a separate
defendant (Mother) had filed a notice of appeal); Hughes v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water,
W2000-01056-WC-R3-CV, 2001 WL 468581, at *43 (Tenn. Workers Comp. Panel May 3,
2001) (memorandum opinion) (in this workers’ compensation case involving two separate
defendants—the employer and the Second Injury Fund—the court, relying on Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a), permitted the Second Injury Fund to appeal despite the
fact that it had filed no notice of appeal, holding that “separate appeals are not required. Any
question of law may be brought up for review by any party once a party has appealed. Thus,
the Second Injury Fund is not without standing to participate in the appeal.”); see also
Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn. 2013) (stating, as dicta,
that under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a) “[o]nce one party has perfected an
appeal or has filed an application for permission to appeal, the other party or parties in the
case are not required to file cross-appeals, separate appeals, or separate applications for
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These two lines of cases—which never cross-reference each
other—are fundamentally incompatible. The first line of cases, consistent
with Spectra, adheres to the well-established authority discussed above119
that the notice of appeal is the procedural mechanism by which jurisdiction
is transferred from the trial court to the appellate court and that, absent the
timely filing of a notice of appeal, the appellate court lacks appellate
jurisdiction and the putative appellant is forever bound by the trial court’s
judgment. By contrast, the second line of cases, consistent with Bryant,
follows Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a) and its Advisory
Commission Comments, holding that so long as one party timely files an
original notice of appeal, any other party—even multiple, separate parties
occupying the same procedural posture as the original appellant—need not
file a timely notice of appeal to invoke appellate jurisdiction and to seek
alteration or enlargement of the trial court’s judgment. Although some
courts have obviously been confronted with the discord between these two
lines of authority,120 no court has attempted to reconcile them. This
reticence is understandable, however, because the problem arises from the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure themselves, rendering the problem
effectively insoluble from a judicial perspective.
C. The Rules’ Inconsistency Regarding Separate Notices of Appeal
Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure neither acknowledge nor
resolve the inconsistency between Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), which require
every putative appellant possessing an independent right of appeal to file a
timely notice of appeal, and Rule 13(a), which provides that “separate
appeals” are “not required.” In various places the Rules and their
Comments contemplate that a single action may involve more than one
appellant121 and that more than one notice of appeal may be filed within a
permission to appeal.”); Torrence v. Higgins Family Ltd. P’ship, E2005-1549-COA-R3-CV,
2006 WL 1132080, at *86 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2006) (holding that, under Tennessee
Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a), “[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal, by any party
involved in the trial court litigation, vests the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to hear and
resolve all issues thereafter raised, not only the issues raised by the party filing the notice of
appeal but also the issues raised by any other party aggrieved by some action of the trial
court.”); Scott v. Noland Co., Aqua Glass Corp., 03A01-9502-CV-00072, 1995 WL 440375,
at *2 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 1995) (noting in case involving two separate appellants
that, under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(a), “[m]ultiple appeals were not
necessary. A party who does not file a notice of appeal can still raise issues in its brief.”).
119. See supra Section II.
120. See, e.g., Studsvik, Inc., E2010-01696-COA-R3-CV (order entered Nov. 17, 2011)
(appellee opposed appeal by defendant that failed to file a separate notice of appeal);
Hughes, 2001 WL 468581, at *43 (employee opposed appeal by Second Injury Fund on
ground that it had failed to file a separate notice of appeal); Bryant, 1994 WL 709021 at *2
(cross-defendant opposed appeals by appellees/cross-plaintiffs that failed to file separate
notices of appeal).
121. See, e.g., TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f) (“The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the notice . . . .”);
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single action, thus acknowledging the actual practice of filing separate
notices of appeal.122 But other parts of the Rules tend to treat appeals as if
they can involve only a single appellant and a single appellee,
contemplating cross-appeal scenarios while not explicitly addressing the
possibility of separate-appeal scenarios not involving cross-appeals.123 Even
the Comments on Rule 13(a) tend to focus on simple cross-appeal scenarios
to the exclusion of narrower separate-appeal scenarios.124 Background to
the original adoption of Rule 13(a) indicates that the effect of Rule 13(a) on
separate appeals other than cross-appeals, as well as the relationship
between Rule 13(a) and Rules 3 and 4, were not fully contemplated or

TENN. R. APP. P. 29(a) (“If separate briefs are filed on behalf of multiple appellants or
multiple appellees, the time for filing and serving a responsive brief shall not commence to
run until all briefs on behalf of all appellants or appellees have been filed.”); TENN. R. APP.
P. 29(a) advisory comm’n cmt. to 1980 amend. (“The sentence added to Rule 29(a) deals
with situations in which there are multiple appellants or multiple appellees. It allows a party
to wait to respond until all of the briefs have been served by all adverse parties.”); TENN. R.
APP. P. 35 advisory comm’n cmt. (“‘[I]f multiple appellants or appellees have a common
interest, they constitute only a single side. If counsel for multiple parties who constitute a
single side feel that additional time is necessary, they may request it.’”) (citation omitted)
(addressing the sequencing of oral argument on appeal).
122. See, e.g., TENN. R. APP. P. 5(c) (“If more than one party files a notice of appeal in
an action appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3, the first party
filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed to be the appellant, unless otherwise directed by the
court.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 5 advisory comm’n cmt. (2012) (“As a practical matter, however,
it is not uncommon for more than one party to file a notice of appeal . . . . A second (or later)
party filing a notice of appeal may file a reply brief pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P.
27(c) . . . .”); TENN. R. APP. P. 16(a) (“If two or more persons file separate notices of appeal
from one judgment or order, the case shall be docketed in the appellate court as a single
appeal.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 16(a) advisory comm’n cmt. to 2005 amend. (“Under paragraph
(a) parties either may file a joint notice of appeal in compliance with Rule 3(f) or they may
file separate notices of appeal. In either situation, when parties are seeking to appeal from a
single judgment or order, the case will be docketed as a single appeal.”).
123. See, e.g., TENN. R. APP. P. 3 1999 advisory commission cmt. (“It is the policy of
the appellate court clerk’s office in cases involving cross appeals to consider the appellant to
be the party who first files a notice of appeal; in the event that the notices are filed on the
same day, the plaintiff in the proceeding below is considered to be the appellant unless the
parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise directs.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 5(c) (“If more than
one party files a notice of appeal in an action appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Tenn. R. App. P. 3, the first party filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed to be the
appellant, unless otherwise directed by the court.”); see also, e.g., Edwards v. Hunt, 635
S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing Rule 13(a) with respect to cross-appeals
without contemplating its effect on separate appeals). Rule 3(f) addresses the required
contents of a notice of appeal where a single attorney represents more than one party
occupying the same posture in the trial court, but it does not and need not expressly address
the situation where multiple parties occupying the same posture in the trial court are
represented by separate counsel; in such event, Rule 3 simply requires that each separate
notice of appeal individually satisfy its requirements. See supra note 58.
124. “The result of eliminating any requirement that an appellee file the appellee’s own
notice of appeal is that once any party files a notice of appeal the appellate court may
consider the case as a whole.” TENN. R. APP. P. 13 advisory comm’n cmt. to Subdivision (a).
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addressed in the context of the drafting and adoption of Tennessee’s Rules
of Appellate Procedure.125
Certain aspects of the Rules and Comments deserve particular
attention. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a) implicitly
acknowledges separate appeals without addressing or resolving Rule
13(a)’s conflict with Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a). Rule 15(a) provides that a
party other than the original appellant that wishes to pursue its own right of
appeal notwithstanding the original appellant’s dismissal of its appeal must
notify the appellate court: “Any party wanting to litigate appellate issues
despite dismissal of the original appeal must provide notice of such intent in
a response to the motion to dismiss.”126 The Comment to this rule explains
that it “provides a procedure for keeping some appellate issues viable
despite the original appellant’s dismissal.”127 The notice required by Rule
15(a) thus operates as a substitute for the original appellant’s notice of
appeal, which is effectively withdrawn upon dismissal of its appeal; in other
words, notice under Rule 15(a) takes over the jurisdictional-transfer
function of the original notice of appeal. For example, were a
plaintiff/appellant to voluntarily dismiss its appeal, a defendant/appellee
that filed no notice of appeal but wishes to assert a cross-appeal
notwithstanding dismissal of the original appeal may do so by filing notice
under Rule 15(a). In the context of cross-appeals, which are by nature
derivative of an original appeal giving the appellate court jurisdiction over
the judgment in favor of the appellee, this notice requirement is consistent
with the rule that dismissal of the original appeal cannot deprive a crossappellant of its right to continue pursuing its own appeal.128
Rule 15(a) does not, however, solve the jurisdictional problem
relating to separate appeals other than cross-appeals. Under Rules 3(e), 3(f),
and 4(a), an appellate court lacks appellate jurisdiction over a separate
appeal where the appellant does not file (either independently or jointly) a
notice of appeal within thirty days of the judgment appealed from.129 Notice
under Rule 15(a) could come far too late to establish appellate jurisdiction
over a separate appeal, which—unlike a cross-appeal—has an independent
125. See supra notes 96–103 & accompanying text.
126. TENN. R. APP. P. 15(a).
127. TENN. R. APP. P. 15 advisory commission cmt. to 2002 amend.; see also TENN. R.
APP. P. 13(a) (“Dismissal of the original appeal shall not preclude issues raised by another
party from being considered by an appellate court.”).
128. See TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a) (“Dismissal of the original appeal shall not preclude
[the appeal of] another party from being considered by an appellate court.”); see also
Edwards, 635 S.W.2d at 698 (“The first question for decision is whether the party filing a
notice of appeal is able to later terminate all counter appeals by dismissing his notice of
appeal. We hold that he cannot.”); supra notes 67, 81 & accompanying text. To permit an
original appellant to cancel a cross-appeal by dismissing its appeal would permit a party to
gain an unfair procedural advantage by being the first to file a notice of appeal. Such a
consequence would undermine the viability of not requiring the filing of notices of crossappeal.
129. See TENN. R. APP. P. 3(e); see also TENN. R. APP. P. 3(f); TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a).
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notice-of-appeal obligation under Rules 3 and 4.130 Rule 15(a) and its
Comment simply do not address the jurisdictional mandate of Rules 3(e),
3(f), and 4(a).
Advisory Commission Comments to the Rules that expressly
reference Rule 13(a) also do not resolve its conflict with Rules 3(e), 3(f),
and 4(a). A 2012 Advisory Commission Comment on Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 5, which addresses the docketing of appeals, mirrors
the conflict.131 This Comment, having quoted Rule 13(a)’s pronouncement
that “separate appeals . . . are not required,” reiterates Rule 13(a)’s position:
“[O]nce one party files a notice of appeal, other parties are not required to
file a separate notice of appeal in order to raise any issue(s) in the
appeal.”132 This Comment, however, does not explicitly address Rule
13(a)’s inconsistency with Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a). Further, Rule 5 and its
Comments presume that, in a doctrinal sense, there is only one “appellant”
per appeal.133 This presumption is consistent with Rule 13(a)’s simplicityoriented “intention . . . that only one notice of appeal be filed” in an
action.134 Yet this presumption is inconsistent with the mandate of Rules
3(f) and 4(a) that each party having an independent right of appeal must
timely file its own notice of appeal, which means that there may be multiple
appellants per action. Rule 5(c) and its Comments thus manifest—without
resolving—the conceptual and procedural inconsistency between Rule
13(a) and Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a). Rule 5(c) wants to take the position that
only a single notice of appeal ever needs to be filed, and thus there is only
one “appellant” per appeal, while at the same time it acknowledges that
multiple parties (i.e., multiple appellants) may each possess and exercise
independent rights of separate appeal. So long as Rule 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a)
impose a mandatory and jurisdictional notice-of-appeal requirement on all
parties wishing to assert independent rights of appeal, these rules ostensibly
require the filing of multiple, separate notices of appeal in separate-appeal
situations.
Although an Advisory Commission Comment on Rule 3(f)
references Rule 13(a), it also does not explicitly address the issue of
separate appeals, and courts have not interpreted this Comment as bearing
130. See TENN. R. APP. P. 15(a); TENN. R. APP. P. 3; TENN. R. APP. P. 4. For example,
were Rule 15(a) used to advance a separate appeal after the original appeal had been
voluntarily dismissed, the notice under Rule 15(a) would almost certainly be filed more than
30 days after the entry of the judgment appealed from.
131. See TENN. R. APP. P. 5 advisory comm’n cmt. (2012).
132. See id.
133. Rule 5(c) and its comments, while conceding that “as a practical matter . . . it is
not uncommon for more than one party to file a notice of appeal,” provide that “[i]f more
than one party files a notice of appeal in an action appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Tenn. R. App. P. 3, the first party filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed to be the
appellant, unless otherwise directed by the court.” See TENN. R. APP. P. 5(c) & advisory
comm’n cmt. (2012). When viewed from the perspective of Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), the
filing of separate notices of appeal is a legal matter, not merely a “practical” one.
134. Henderson v. Mabry, 838 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
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on the conflict between the two rules. This Comment instead focuses on the
scope of an appeal after a timely notice of appeal has been filed:
Scope of review is treated in Rule 13. This subdivision
[Rule 3(f)] read in conjunction with Rule 13(a) permits any
question of law to be brought up for review [(except as
otherwise provided in Rule 3(e)] as long as any party
formally declares an intention to appeal in a timely
fashion.135
The reference here to Rule 13(a) aligns with its first sentence:
“Except as otherwise provided in Rule 3(e), any question of law may be
brought up for review and relief by any party.”136 The point of both this first
sentence of Rule 13(a) and the Comment to Rule 3(f) is to reinforce
Tennessee’s simplicity-oriented position that a notice of appeal is not
designed to operate as a “review-limiting device.”137 In other words, once a
timely notice of appeal has been filed, the appellant may, as a general rule,
raise legal issues on appeal with respect to the action as a whole138
(provided, of course, that the issues were properly preserved below139).
Courts citing the Comment to Rule 3(f)—that “Rule 13(a) permits
any question of law to be brought up for review . . . as long as any party
formally declares an intention to appeal in a timely fashion”—have
typically not viewed it as permitting separate appeals without the filing of
separate notices of appeal. Rather, these courts have cited the Comment in
support of a liberal and forgiving interpretation of Rule 3(f)’s requirement
that a notice of appeal “shall designate the judgment from which relief is
sought.”140 Despite the reference to Rule 13(a), the Advisory Commission
135. TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to subdivision (f).
136. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a).
137. TENN. R. APP. P. 13 advisory comm’n cmt. to subdivision (a).
138. See id.
139. The well-settled general doctrine of waiver, though not referenced in Rule 3(e) or
Rule 13(a), has qualified Rule 13(a)’s statement that “any question of law” may be raised on
appeal. See, e.g., Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys. Inc., 312 S.W.3d 496, 511 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is
axiomatic that parties will not be permitted to raise issues on appeal that they did not first
raise in the trial court.”); Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 918 (Tenn. 2009) (“One cardinal
principle of appellate practice is that a party who fails to raise an issue in the trial court
waives its right to raise that issue on appeal.”).
140. See, e.g., Cox v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 297 S.W.3d 237, 242–43 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2009) (citing advisory commission comment to Rule 3(f) to support a liberal view of
the requirement that a notice of appeal designate the judgment from which relief is sought
and holding that designating final judgment but not a prior order from which relief was
sought did not preclude appellate review of that order); In re NHC–Nashville Fire Litigation,
293 S.W.3d 547, 556–60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (same); Consolidated Waste Sys., LLC v.
Thompson v. Logan, M2005-02379-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2405130, at *14–21 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 23, 2007) (citing advisory commission comment to Rule 3(f) in context of
holding that an un-amended premature notice of appeal that failed to designate subsequently
entered order was nonetheless sufficient to bring up the case as a whole, including the order
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Comment on Rule 3(f) does not resolve or even address the conflict
between the Spectra and Bryant lines of cases.
By providing in Rule 13(a) that “separate appeals” are not required,
the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure take a position that simply
cannot be reconciled with the stringent notice-of-appeal requirements
imposed by Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a). The irreconcilability of these rules,
each of which strikes fundamentally at the very basis for appellate
jurisdiction, has engendered the judicial split of authority. This
inconsistency departs from the policies underlying Tennessee’s Rules of
Appellate Procedure that favor simplicity, coherence, and justice: “A
principal purpose of these rules is to bring together in one place a
simplified, coherent, and modern body of law.”141
PART III. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF SEPARATE
NOTICES OF APPEAL IN TENNESSEE
The problem, as explained above, is that Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 13(a), which provides that “separate appeals” are
unnecessary, directly conflicts with Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), which require as a jurisdictional
prerequisite the timely filing of “separate” notices of appeal. Although the
drafting and adoption of Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure
represented a tremendous step forward for Tennessee law, and the work of
the Tennessee Supreme Court Advisory Commission on Civil Rules and the
Reporter in the 1970s should be applauded, Rule 13(a) has proved to be an
anomaly. Because this anomaly is imbedded within Tennessee’s Rules of
in question, for appellate review); Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
M2002-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1541860, at *48–52 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2005)
(citing advisory commission comment to Rule 3(f) in support of holding that failure to
designate order awarding attorneys’ fees entered after final judgment did not preclude
review of that award); Oakley ex rel. Oakley v. State, W2002-00095-COA-R3-CV, 2003
WL 103215, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2003) (citing advisory commission comment to
Rule 3(f) in support of holding that failure to designate judgment from which relief was
sought did not preclude appellate review of it); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 996 S.W.3d 803, 810–11
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing advisory commission comment to Rule 3(f) in support of
holding that failure to designate judgment from which relief was sought did not preclude
appellate review of it).
141. TENN. R. APP. P. 1 advisory comm’n cmt.; see also TENN. R. APP. P. 1 (“These
rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
proceeding on its merits.”); TENN. R. APP. P. 2 (“For good cause, including the interest of
expediting decision upon any matter, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or Court of
Criminal Appeals may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a
particular case on motion of a party or on its motion and may order proceedings in
accordance with its discretion, except that this rule shall not permit the extension of time for
filing a notice of appeal prescribed in Rule 4 . . . .”); Overnite Transp. Co. v. Teamsters
Local Union No. 480, 172 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tenn. 2005) (citing TENN. R. APP. P. 1 advisory
comm’n cmt.); Johnson v. Hardin, 926 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tenn. 1996); PIVNICK, supra note
2, § 30:1.
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Appellate Procedure itself, it properly deserves a rule-based solution. As
suggested when these Rules were first proposed, “experience [has] . . .
help[ed] illuminate” the effectiveness of the proposed rules, and “[t]he need
for ongoing procedural reform . . . seems evident.”142
A. First Proposal: Deleting “Separate Appeals” from Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 13(a)
The simplest solution to the problem of separate appeals would be
to amend Rule 13(a) by deleting from the second sentence of the rule the
phrase “separate appeals” and its preceding and following commas: “Crossappeals, separate appeals, and separate applications for permission to
appeal are not required.” Rule 13(a) could also be clarified by stating that
“notices” of cross-appeal are not required.143 The second sentence of Rule
13(a) would thus be revised to state as follows: “Notices of cross-appeal
and separate applications for permission to appeal are not required.”
Under this proposal, no other changes to the text of the Rules
would be required, though one other textual change would be strongly
recommended. The first sentence of Rule 13(a)—”Except as otherwise
provided in Rule 3(e), any question of law may be brought up for review by
any party.”—should be deleted. As discussed above, when Tennessee’s
Rules of Appellate Procedure were first adopted, Rule 13(a) had two
intended purposes: rejecting federal courts’ use of the notice of appeal as a
means for limiting the scope of an appeal to a particular order, and rejecting
the federal courts’ requirement that an appellee file a notice of cross-appeal
to be eligible to raise its own issues on appeal.144
Most courts applying the first sentence of Rule 13(a) have
interpreted it consistently with one of these two purposes. Some Tennessee
appellate courts have cited the first sentence of Rule 13(a) in support of the
proposition that an appellee need not file a notice of cross-appeal to have
standing on appeal to alter or to enlarge the judgment at issue.145 And some
142. See Sobieski, Theoretical Foundations, supra note 75, at 179.
143. From a grammatical and stylistic viewpoint, stating that “cross-appeals are not
required” means that persons who possess rights of cross-appeal need not assert them; but
the apparent intent is that notices of cross-appeal need not be filed for rights of cross-appeal
to be perfected, which reading is bolstered by Rule 13(a)’s explicit reference to “separate
applications for permission to appeal” (emphasis added). This aspect of Rule 13(a) should
be revised to more clearly express its apparent intent. Applications for permission to appeal
to the Tennessee Supreme Court are governed by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11,
which gives the Tennessee Supreme Court discretion to determine which appeals to accept.
144. See supra notes 91, 93 & accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Carrier Corp., 193 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tenn. 2006); State v.
Russell, 800 S.W.2d 169, 170–71 (Tenn. 1990); see also Rodgers v. GCA Servs. Grp., Inc.,
W2012-01173-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 543828, at *2–3 nn.3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13,
2013), reh’g denied (Feb. 28, 2013); Skaan v. Fed. Exp. Corp., W2011-01807-COA-R3-CV,
2012 WL 6212891, at *4 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2012); Harrell v. Harrell, 321 S.W.3d
508, 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); Dillard Smith Constr. Co. v. Comm’r of Labor &
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courts have cited the first sentence of Rule 13(a) to support a liberal
interpretation of Rule 3(f)’s requirement that the notice of appeal “shall
designate the judgment from which relief is sought,” holding that prejudgment, interlocutory orders may be addressed on appeal notwithstanding
their not being specifically identified in the notice of appeal.146
But other courts have cited the first sentence of Rule 13(a) to
support the proposition that a separate appeal may be advanced despite the
failure to file a separate notice of appeal.147 To the extent that the first
sentence of Rule 13(a) supports this last interpretation, retaining that
sentence in Rule 13(a) could undercut the reform effected by deleting
“separate appeals” from the second sentence of Rule 13(a).
The first sentence of Rule 13(a) is unnecessary to Tennessee’s
Rules of Appellate Procedure. To the extent that it means that an appellee
need not file its own notice of appeal to seek to alter or enlarge the
judgment on appeal, it is duplicative of the second sentence of Rule 13(a),
which already provides that “[c]ross-appeals . . . are not required.” And to
the extent that the first sentence of Rule 13(a) means that a notice of appeal
need not specifically identify interlocutory orders for issues relating to them
Workforce Dev., M2008-00735-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4841073, at *7 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 15, 2009); Flautt & Mann v. Council of City of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 867 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2008); Quebecor Printing Corp. v. L & B Mfg. Co., 209 S.W.3d 565, 582–83
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Flautt & Mann v. Council of City of Memphis, W2004-01188-COAR3-CV, 2005 WL 940568, at *9 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2005); Heatherly v. Campbell
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., E2004-02004-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 562752, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 10, 2005); Glover v. Hardeman Cnty., 713 S.W.2d 73, 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Eller
Bros., Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Nashville, 623 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn.
1999).
146. See, e.g., Bell v. Eller Media Co., W2010-01241-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 255115,
at *2 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2011), perm. app. denied (May 25, 2011); Cox v. Tenn.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 297 S.W.3d 237, 242–43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); In re NHC–
Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d 547, 556–60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); Thompson v. Logan,
M2005-02379-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2405130, at *11–18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007);
Consol. Waste Sys., LLC v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., M2002-02582COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1541860, at *42–45 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2005); J.W.G. v.
T.L.H.G., M2002-02656-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 22794537, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
25, 2003); Glidden v. Glidden, 86-320-II, 1987 WL 9452, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16,
1987); see also Oakley ex rel. Oakley v. State, W2002-00095-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL
103215, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2003) (holding that failure to identify any judgment in
notice of appeal is not fatal to the appeal); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 996 S.W.2d 803, 807–11
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
147. See, e.g., Hughes v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, W2000-01056-WC-R3-CV,
2001 WL 468581, at *3 (Tenn. Workers Comp. Panel May 3, 2001) (memorandum opinion);
Bryant v. Gill, 02A01-9311-CV-00259, 1994 WL 709021, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22,
1994); see also Torrence v. Higgins Family Ltd. P’ship, E2005-1549-COA-R3-CV, 2006
WL 1132080, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2006) (citing the first sentence of Rule 13(a)
and holding that once any party files a notice of appeal, “[a]ll parties are allowed to raise
such issues as they see fit.”); cf. In re Adoption of D.P.E., E2005-02865-COA-R3-PT, 2006
WL 2417578, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2006) (permitting separate appeal without the
filing of a separate notice of appeal and citing Torrence).
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to be advanced on appeal, it addresses the matter so vaguely and obliquely
that it has not definitively decided the question.148 If Rule 3(f) is to mean
that once a notice of appeal identifies “the judgment from which relief is
sought,” any interlocutory order may be addressed on appeal, it would be
better for Rule 3(f) simply to say so plainly and directly.
The first sentence of Rule 13(a) has also yielded other interpretive
questions: May any question of fact as well as “any question of law” be
raised on appeal?149 By beginning with the specific proviso “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in Rule 3(e),” which provides that the appeal of certain
issues can be waived by failing to take action in the trial court, does the first
sentence of Rule 13(a) impliedly override unreferenced, general commonlaw requirements regarding preserving issues for appeal?150 And, as
discussed above, the first sentence of Rule 13(a) is so broad that it could
arguably support alteration or enlargement on appeal of a judgment over
which the appellate court does not properly exercise appellate jurisdiction
based on Rules 3 and 4.151
Retaining the current first sentence of Rule 13(a) could perpetuate
the separate-appeal problem. Were the first sentence of Rule 13(a) deleted,
the title of this subsection should be revised as well to correspond with the
change. If revised as proposed, Rule 13(a) would state in full as follows:
“(a) Cross-Appeals and Separate Applications for Permission to Appeal.
Notices of cross-appeal and separate applications for permission to appeal
are not required. Dismissal of the original appeal shall not preclude issues
raised by another party from being considered by an appellate court.”
Because courts often cite Advisory Commission Comments to the
Rules, according them deference,152 corresponding additions to certain
148. In re NHC–Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d at 556–60 (discussing split of
authority regarding whether orders not specifically identified in a notice of appeal may be
addressed on appeal and citing cases); Thompson, 2007 WL 2405130, at *11–18 (same);
Consol. Waste Sys., 2005 WL 1541860, at *42–45 (same).
149. Courts addressing this question have answered yes. See, e.g., Glover, 713 S.W.2d
at 78; Eller Bros., 623 S.W.2d at 625.
150. The answer appears to be no. See, e.g., Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 918
(Tenn. 2009) (“One cardinal principle of appellate practice is that a party who fails to raise
an issue in the trial court waives its right to raise that issue on appeal.”); State Dept. of
Children’s Servs. v. Owens, 129 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tenn. 2004) (“This Court ‘is a court of
appeals and errors, and we are limited in authority to the adjudication of issues that are
presented and decided in the trial courts, and a record thereof preserved as prescribed in the
statutes and Rules of this Court.’”) (citations omitted). At least one court has explicitly held
that the first sentence of Rule 13(a) does not override such general waiver principles.
Wellington v. Ledford, 01-A-01-9807-CH00363, 1999 WL 499776, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 16, 1999).
151. See, e.g., Torrence, 2006 WL 1132080, at *6 (“The timely filing of a notice of
appeal, by any party involved in the trial court litigation, vests the Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction to hear and resolve all issues thereafter raised, not only the issues raised by the
party filing the notice of appeal but also the issues raised by any other party aggrieved by
some action of the trial court.” (citing TENN. R. APP. P. 13(a)).
152. See In re NHC–Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d at 560.
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Advisory Commission Comments to the Rules of Appellate Procedure
would also be warranted.153 The following Comment to Rule 13(a)—or
something like it—should be inserted:
Rule 13(a) has been amended to clarify that the assertion of
a separate appeal (other than a cross-appeal) requires the
filing of a notice of appeal and bond in compliance with
Rules 3, 4, 5, and 6. Separate rights of appeal arise in an
action when two or more parties each possess a right of
appeal other than a right of cross-appeal. This amendment
is intended to correct the discrepancy that formerly existed
between Rule 13(a), which stated that “separate appeals”
were not required, with Rules 3 and 4, which require each
party seeking to initiate an appeal as of right to properly
file (independently or jointly) a notice of appeal. This
amendment does not, however, affect cross-appeals (which
arise only when an appellee asserts its own right of appeal
relating to a judgment from which another party has
already appealed). This amendment also does not affect
applications for permission to appeal.
This proposed Comment states the purpose of the amendment,
defines and contrasts separate appeals and cross-appeals, and explains that
separate appeals must meet the same requirements under Rules 3, 4, 5, and
6 that govern an original appeal. Because cross-appeals and separate
appeals in the narrower sense would be treated differently, clearly defining
the difference between a cross-appeal (as derivative) and a separate appeal
is crucial to the proposed Comment’s practicability.
The proposed Comment should also provide that the following
statement contained in the original Advisory Commission Comment on
Subdivision (a) of Rule 13 is to be deleted or is no longer to be followed:
“The result of eliminating any requirement that an appellee file the
appellee’s own notice of appeal is that once any party files a notice of
appeal the appellate court may consider the case as a whole.” This original
Advisory Commission Comment on Subdivision (a) would be unnecessary
in light of the amendment and would be inconsistent with the position that
appellees must file notices of separate appeal when they seek to alter or
enlarge a judgment relating to a non-appealing party, and its retention could
cause unwarranted confusion regarding the scope of appellate review where
some but not all eligible parties perfect an appeal. This Comment is also
inconsistent with Rule 3(f). If a “case as a whole” may be addressed on
appeal once any party has filed an original notice of appeal, as ostensibly
indicated by the Advisory Commission Comment on Subdivision (a) of
153. See, e.g., TENN. R. APP. P. 3 advisory comm’n cmt. to subsection (f); TENN. R.
APP. P. 5 advisory comm’n cmt. (2012).
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Rule 13, then Rule 3(f)’s requirement that the notice of appeal identify “the
judgment from which relief is sought” would be superfluous. If the “case as
a whole” were brought up for review simply based on the filing of an
original notice of appeal, then identifying the judgment in the notice of
appeal would have no meaning apart perhaps from determining the
timeliness of the appeal.
The following Comment to Rule 5 should also be inserted: “Rule
13(a) has been amended to clarify that the assertion of a separate appeal
(other than a cross-appeal) requires the filing of a notice of appeal and bond
in compliance with Rules 3, 4, 5, and 6.” This Comment would be
necessary in response to the 2012 Advisory Commission Comment to Rule
5, which reiterates the position taken by Rule 13(a) that separate notices of
appeal are unnecessary.154
These changes to the text and comments are supported by four
reasons. First, these changes would clarify that Rule 13(a) is not intended to
abrogate any of the notice-of-appeal requirements set forth by Rules 3(e),
3(f), and 4(a) with respect to separate appeals other than cross-appeals. The
efficiency interest involved in imposing a jurisdictional effect on the timely
filing of a notice of appeal would remain supported. To invoke appellate
jurisdiction, multiple putative appellants possessing independent rights of
appeal would each either have to expressly join in a single, timely notice of
appeal or have to file separate, timely notices of appeal. The conflict
between Rule 13(a), on the one hand, and Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), on the
other, would thus be eliminated, and the long-chosen jurisdictional effect of
filing a notice of appeal would be reaffirmed, free from the ambiguity
currently stemming from Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Second, the remainder of Tennessee’s appellate structure would
remain unaffected. Tennessee could continue not to require the filing of
notices of cross-appeal. Because cross-appeals are by definition derivative
and dependent on the prior filing of a notice of appeal, and because the
appellate court thus already necessarily exercises appellate jurisdiction over
the judgment at issue, Rule 13(a)’s technical discrepancy with Rules 3 and
4 by not requiring the filing of notices of cross-appeal does not pose the
same jurisdictional and procedural problems as with separate appeals
defined more narrowly, which are based on independent rights of appeal.155
And because applications for permission to appeal to the Tennessee
Supreme Court under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 are
permissive and discretionary, as opposed to appeals as of right, the
Supreme Court has the power to accept cases as a whole even when only a
single Rule 11 application has been submitted.156
154. See supra notes 131–132 & accompanying text.
155. See supra Section III(A).
156. See TENN. R. APP. P. 11. A comment should also be added to Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 11. The 1999 Advisory Commission comment states, “Concerning the
scope of an answer under Rule 11(d), consult Rule 13(a), which permits the appellee to raise
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Third, the Rules and their application would become fairer. As
illustrated by contrasting the two conflicting lines of authority, in a
separate-appeal scenario a party’s failure to file a separate notice of appeal
from a truly final judgment has two potential consequences, depending on
which line of authority happens to be applied: advancement of the appeal,
with a corresponding possibility of relief for the appellant, or dismissal of
the appeal with prejudice. These two inconsistent results—which arise from
a single procedural circumstance—differ in the most extreme and ultimate
of ways, amounting, in a legal sense, to the difference between life and
death. And based on the current language of the rules, each of these
irreconcilable outcomes is arguably correct.157 “It will not do to decide the
same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another.”158 Amending Rule 13(a) by deleting “separate appeals”
would promote uniform outcomes regarding failures to file separate
appeals, thereby reinforcing the simplicity and rationality of the Rules and
promoting their equal application to similarly situated litigants.
Fourth, Tennessee would lose the “simplicity” of requiring only
one notice of appeal per appeal, but this is no real loss; even under the
current structure of the Rules this degree of simplicity is not, and never has
been, consistently attainable, as is already tacitly acknowledged by
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 5(c) and 16(a).159 Even in light of
a liberal reading of Rule 13(a), under Rules 3 and 4 multi-party litigation
involving more than a single plaintiff and a single defendant has inevitably
issues allegedly decided erroneously by the intermediate appellate court.” TENN. R. APP. P.
11, 1999 advisory comm’n cmt. This comment suggests, without explicitly stating, that an
answer in opposition to an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court under Rule 11 is an appropriate vehicle for Rule 11 respondents to raise their own
issues for cross-appeal before the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Tennessee Supreme Court
has held that “parties who have not perfected an appeal or filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11
application may raise additional issues and seek relief on their own” by addressing those
issues in their responsive brief on the merits, as provided under Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 27(b). Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn. 2013). But
on this point the Court has also cited the 1999 advisory commission comment. See Hodge v.
Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 n.10 (Tenn. 2012). Because this comment appears to reference
the first sentence of Rule 13(a), were the first sentence of Rule 13(a) deleted as proposed, the
1999 advisory commission comment would lose its referent. To compensate for this
deletion, a comment should be added to Rule 11 expressly stating whether a respondent to a
Rule 11 application must state its cross-appeal issues in its answer in opposition in order to
preserve them for appeal before the Tennessee Supreme Court in the event that the
application were granted.
157. The 2012 advisory commission comment to Rule 5(c), which reiterates the
position taken by Rule 13(a), does not resolve the conflict. See supra notes 131–132 &
accompanying text.
158. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921).
159. “If more than one party files a notice of appeal in an action appealed to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3, the first party filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed to be the appellant, unless otherwise directed by the court.” TENN. R. APP. P. 5(c).
“If two or more persons file separate notices of appeal from one judgment or order, the case
shall be docketed in the appellate court as a single appeal.” TENN. R. APP. P. 16(a).
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given rise to separate-appeal scenarios (other than cross-appeals) in which
multiple parties have been faced with the potential necessity of filing an
original notice of appeal. Consequently, the filing of multiple notices of
appeal within a single action has often occurred.160
Notwithstanding, the proposed changes would mean that, in multiparty scenarios in Tennessee involving more than just a single appellant and
single appellee, some parties possessing rights of appeal might have to
protectively assert those rights because they lack the opportunity to wait
and see if an opposing party appeals first.161 In Tennessee, a single thirtyday period applies to all parties desiring to assert independent rights of
appeal.162 This differs, for example, from federal appellate procedure
providing that once a timely original notice of appeal has been filed, any
other party may file a notice of appeal (either cross-appeal or separate
appeal) within fourteen days.163 The civil appellate procedures of many
other states correspond with this federal procedure.164 Unless Tennessee
160. In addition, Tennessee could and should consider whether not requiring the filing
of notices of cross-appeal remains preferable to and more rational and efficient than its
current structure for appeals. See supra Section III(A); see infra Section IV(B). Fully
addressing this point, however, lies outside the scope of this Article.
161. For example, a defendant that obtains a favorable trial-court judgment against two
separate plaintiffs may, in the event that only one of the plaintiffs appeals during the first 29
days of the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal, have to file a protective notice of
appeal to preserve its right of appeal against the second, non-appealing plaintiff. What would
be a right of cross-appeal by the defendant against the second plaintiff in the event that it
appealed becomes an independent right of appeal in the event that the second plaintiff does
not appeal, but the defendant is limited to the same 30-day period as the second plaintiff to
assert its right of appeal.
162. See TENN. R. APP. P. 4(a) (“In an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with and received by the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment appealed from . . . .”).
163. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (“Multiple Appeals. If one party timely files a notice
of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the
first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever
period ends later.”); see also, e.g., Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp., 615 F.3d 735, 739–40
(7th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3) to separate appeal);
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 2010)
(same); Sands v. Wagner, 314 F. App’x 506, 507 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); Woodruff v.
Covington, 389 F.3d 1117, 1120–21 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); Ark. Right to Life State
Political Action Comm. v. Butler, 146 F.3d 558, 559–60 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); In re Julien
Co., 146 F.3d 420, 422–23 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); N. Am. Sav. Ass’n v. Metroplex Dev.
P’ship, 931 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); In re Crystal Palace Gambling Hall,
Inc., 817 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7 (“The
14-day provision is not limited to cross-appeals, and plainly encompasses appeals by other
parties such as co-parties or third-party defendants.”); KNIBB, supra note 68, § 11:1; TIGAR
& TIGAR, supra note 53, § 6:3.
164. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.108 (“If an appellant timely appeals from a judgment or
appealable order, the time for any other party to appeal from the same judgment or order is
extended until 20 days after the superior court clerk serves notification of the first appeal.”);
COLO. APP. R. 4(a) (“If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file
a notice of appeal within 14 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal is filed, or
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were also to amend its appellate procedure to provide that the filing of an
original appeal triggers a subsequent period for the filing of separate
appeals, which might be preferable but which would entail a broader
revision of current Tennessee appellate procedure, the occasional filing of
protective notices of separate appeal may be required.165
The potential need for the filing of protective notices of appeal
highlights the significant degree to which the proposed change would affect
current appellate procedure. If cross-appeals were defined as appeals
asserted against another party that has already filed a notice of appeal,
appeals by appellees against parties that have not appealed would not fall
within the time otherwise prescribed by this section (a), whichever period last expires.”); DE.
R. SUP. CT. 6(b) (“In any civil action in which a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 15 days after the date on which the first
notice of appeal was filed, or within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order from
which the appeal is taken, whichever is later.”); HAW. R. APP. P. 4.1(a)(1)–(2) (“(1) If a
timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may, if allowed by law, file a
cross-appeal. (2) In civil cases involving multiple-party plaintiffs or defendants, if one party
files a timely notice of appeal, any other party, whether on the same or opposite side as the
party first appealing, may file a notice of cross-appeal.”); ILL. R. SUP. CT. 303(a)(3) (“If a
timely notice of appeal is filed and served by a party, any other party, within 10 days after
service upon him or her, or within 30 days from the entry of the judgment or order being
appealed, or within 30 days of the entry of the order disposing of the last pending
postjudgment motion, whichever is later, may join in the appeal, appeal separately, or crossappeal by filing a notice of appeal, indicating which type of appeal is being taken.”); ME. R.
APP. P. 2(b)(3) (“If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a
notice of appeal (accompanied, when required, by the filing fee or a request to have the fee
waived pursuant to ME. R. Civ. P. 91) within 14 days of the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise herein prescribed, whichever period last
expires.”); MD. R. CIR. CT. 7-104(d) (“If one party files a timely notice of appeal, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within ten days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed or within any longer time otherwise allowed by this Rule.”); MASS. R. APP.
P. 4(a) (“If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of
appeal within fourteen days of the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or
within the time otherwise prescribed by this rule, whichever period last expires.”); NEV. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(2) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file and
serve a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was served, or
within the time otherwise prescribed by Rule 4(a), whichever period last expires.”); N.D. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(2) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice
of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time
otherwise prescribed by this subdivision, whichever period ends later.”); OHIO APP. R.
4(B)(1) (“If a notice of appeal is timely filed by a party, another party may file a notice of
appeal within the appeal time period otherwise prescribed by this rule or within ten days of
the filing of the first notice of appeal.”); R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 4(a) (“If a timely notice of appeal is
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within twenty (20) days of the
date on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by
this subdivision, whichever period last expires.”); VT. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) (“If one party timely
files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the
date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this rule,
whichever period ends later.”); WYO. R. APP. P. 2.01(a)(2) (“If a timely notice of appeal is
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 15 days of the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed.”).
165. See supra notes 24–26 & accompanying text.

2014] REFORMING TENNESSEE’S RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

65

under the definition of cross-appeal but rather would be characterized as
separate appeals.
For example, assume that a plaintiff timely appeals from an adverse
judgment in favor of a defendant, and the defendant subsequently wishes to
alter or to enlarge a judgment that adjudicated rights and obligations
between the defendant and a second plaintiff that did not file a notice of
appeal. Figure 5 represents this scenario graphically.
Plaintiff 1

Defendant

Plaintiff 2
Figure 5

In Figure 5, the arrow pointing from Plaintiff 1 toward Defendant
represents Plaintiff 1’s right of appeal, which has been perfected by the
timely filing of Plaintiff 1’s notice of appeal. The arrow pointing from
Defendant toward Plaintiff 2 represents Defendant’s right of appeal against
Plaintiff 2. In this scenario, under the proposed amendment of Rule 13(a),
including its proposed definition of a cross-appeal as derivative,
Defendant’s attempted appeal with respect to Plaintiff 2 would be
unperfected because Defendant possesses an independent right of separate
appeal. This is so because the judgment that adjudicated the rights and
obligations between Defendant and Plaintiff 1 is severable and separate
from the judgment that adjudicated the rights and obligations between
Defendant and Plaintiff 2. The proposed amendment of Rule 13(a) employs
a narrow definition of cross-appeals (as derivative) that would require
Defendant to file a notice of appeal (whether protective or otherwise) to
perfect its right of appeal relative to Plaintiff 2.
The proposed amendment of Rule 13(a) thus unavoidably departs
from the Advisory Commission’s apparent intent, when adopting the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to permit appeals by an appellee
without the need for the appellee ever to file a notice of appeal. Such a
divergence would be necessary, however, so long as the jurisdictional
mandate of Rules 3 and 4 is to apply to rights of appeal other than the
original appeal within an action (i.e., the first notice of appeal filed) and so
long as cross-appeals are defined as derivative.
Were cross-appeals defined more expansively to include an appeal
asserted by an appellee against a non-appealing party (thus defining crossappeals to include non-derivative appeals so long as the party asserting the
appeal may be characterized as an appellee), the need for an appellee to file
its own notice of appeal would be reduced. But expanding the definition of
cross-appeals in this manner would create some of the very same problems
identified in relation to the Rule’s current structure. For example, an
appellee could, without filing a notice of appeal, seek relief on appeal
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against a non-appealing party and related judgment; appellate jurisdiction
over the non-appealing party and the judgment relating to it would thus
arise vicariously based on the filing of an original notice of appeal by an
unrelated, potentially adverse party. As discussed below, such a method of
attaining appellate jurisdiction is atypical.166 Further, the line between
cross-appeals and separate appeals would become awfully thin and difficult
for courts to draw. Tennessee’s attempt, for the sake of simplicity, to reduce
the number of notices of appeal that must be filed in relation to a single
action has yielded unanticipated complications.
These concerns raise the question whether, ultimately, the most
practicable and conceptually sound solution is simply requiring all parties
that wish to pursue a right of appeal to file a notice indicating the exercise
of that right, as is provided for by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
and the rules of appellate procedure for most states.167
B. Second Proposal: Overhauling Tennessee’s Structure for Notices of
Appeal
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require each party
wishing to pursue an appeal—whether an original appeal, a cross-appeal, or
a separate appeal—to file its own notice of appeal.168 Under this structure
for notices of appeals, the appellate court, the appellate court clerk, and the
litigants know well before briefing (unlike in Tennessee) what rights of
appeal are being asserted.169 Because any party may assert a cross-appeal or
separate appeal within fourteen days after the filing of an original notice of
appeal, parties largely satisfied with a judgment can wait and see if an
original notice of appeal has been filed before deciding whether to assert
their own appeals.170 While this federal procedure has its own complexities,
it is consistent with a party-driven, adversarial system in which each party
seeking to perfect its own appeal must take its own action to do so, giving
clear notice of its intent. Most states have adopted a similar structure for
notices of appeal.171
An alternative, equally viable, and arguably preferable solution to
Tennessee’s problem of separate appeals is overhauling its entire structure
for notices of appeal along the lines of the federal system. This solution
would eliminate the problem posed by Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 13(a) and would allow Tennessee to obtain more guidance from
the analogous procedures of federal courts and most other states, but it
would necessitate a more extensive reform of Tennessee’s Rules of
166. See infra Section IV(C); see also supra note 102 & accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 69–71 & accompanying text; see infra Section IV(B).
168. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1), (3).
169. See supra notes 68–69 & accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 68–69, 74, 163 & accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 70–71, 164 & accompanying text.
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Appellate Procedure. The following is a non-exhaustive list of required
changes and considerations: (1) Rule 13(a) would have to be amended to
delete the provisions that notices of cross-appeal as well as notices of
separate appeal are not required and that any question of law may be raised
by any party; (2) Rules Advisory Commission Comments would have to be
added to various rules clarifying this change, including Rules 3, 5, 13, 15,
and 27; (3) the Advisory Commission should decide whether the timely
filing of a notice of cross-appeal or separate appeal within a certain time
after the filing of an original notice of appeal would be deemed a
jurisdictional requirement; (4) the Advisory Commission should decide
whether notices of cross-appeal should have the same required contents as
an original notice of appeal; and (5) the Advisory Commission and
appellate court clerk should consider how to manage the docketing of
appeals and the sequencing of briefing and oral argument in light of the
change.
C. Third Proposal: Amending Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure
3 and 4
A third alternative solution would be to leave Rule 13(a) and
related comments as written and to revise Rules 3 and 4 to clarify that only
one notice of appeal per appeal is ever required, regardless of whether the
action involves a separate-appeal scenario. All separate appeals, including
cross-appeals, would thus be treated the same. Although one might argue
that the 2012 Advisory Commission comment on Rule 5(c) has already
clarified that Rule 13(a) trumps Rules 3 and 4,172 neither that comment nor
Rules 3 or 4 expressly address the discrepancy between Rule 13(a) and
Rules 3 and 4.173 If Tennessee really wants Rule 13(a) to override the
jurisdictional mandate of Rules 3 and 4 with respect to independent rights
of separate appeal as well as rights of cross-appeal, it should say so
expressly and unambiguously by rule and comment. Tennessee’s current
Rules of Appellate Procedure and comments have not done so.
Were Rule 13(a) to be retained in its current form, the following
clarifications would be warranted. Rule 3(f) should be changed to state that
only an original appeal (i.e., the first appeal asserted by any party to the
action) must comply with the notice-of-appeal requirements of Rules 3, 4, 5
and 6. If Rule 13(a) is in fact to mean that separate notices of appeal of any
kind are never required, then the conventions in Rule 3(f) for identifying
multiple appellants within a single notice of appeal (the use of “et al.” and
so forth) would be rendered superfluous and should be deleted. Comments
to the Rules should expressly clarify that, in light of Rule 13(a), appellate
jurisdiction may be exercised over all rights of appeal, including
independent rights of appeal, once any party to an action properly files an
172. See TENN. R. APP. P. 5(c) advisory comm’n cmt. (2012).
173. See supra notes 131–134 & accompanying text.
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original notice of appeal. Rule 13(a) should also be clarified to provide that
“separate notices of appeal” are not required, thus correcting a current
stylistic deficiency.
Though apparently simple, resolving the discrepancy by amending
Rule 3 and related comments in this manner would have the unavoidable
effect of narrowing Tennessee’s chosen jurisdictional aspect of the noticeof-appeal requirements currently embodied in Rules 3(f) and 4(a). Such an
approach would yield the unusual result that some parties would routinely
have the right to rely on the conduct of separate, adverse parties for
purposes of perfecting their own independent appeals and obtaining
appellate jurisdiction in the first instance (as opposed to derivatively
asserting cross-appeals).174 In essence, what is now viewed as a
jurisdictional requirement for all putative appellants possessing independent
rights of appeal would be reduced by rule to a jurisdictional requirement for
no one in particular, so long as someone files a timely notice of appeal.
Such an approach—as is in fact employed by the line of a cases applying
Rule 13(a) in separate-appeal scenarios—essentially permits vicarious
compliance with a jurisdictional requirement.
This approach would at base be inconsistent with the typical
jurisdictional approach to notices of appeal.175 Insofar as separate appellants
might have mutually adverse interests with respect to an appeal, permitting
an appellant possessing an independent right of appeal to rely on a notice of
appeal filed by another, adverse party also possessing an independent right
of appeal would be incongruous with typical civil procedure and the
adversarial, party-driven nature of our legal system.176
174. Some courts in other jurisdictions have on occasion excused the failure to file
separate appeals in multi-party situations. See, e.g., Ruggieri v. City of E. Providence, 593
A.2d 55, 57 (R.I. 1991); WRIGHT, supra note 53, § 3950.7 (citing federal cases and
observing that “[t]he separate notice requirement is thus treated as a matter of practice, not
appellate jurisdiction. Exercise of the power has been rare, however, requiring a showing of
exceptional circumstances.”).
175. See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 59, § 303.40[1][b] (In federal courts,
“[o]nly a person who has filed a timely notice of appeal may join in an appeal . . . . [A]
person who has not filed a timely notice of appeal may not become an appellant by joining
the appeal of a party who has filed a timely notice.”); id., § 304.11[c] (“[I]f a party desires to
challenge an order or judgment of the district court, it must file a timely notice of appeal; a
party cannot rely upon another party to act as its surrogate. Thus, if a party desires to
challenge an order or judgment, the party ordinarily must file a notice of appeal, as opposed
to arguing that it should benefit from the result in another party’s appeal.”); WRIGHT, supra
note 53, § 3950.7 (in federal courts, “[t]he fact that one party has taken a timely appeal does
not permit the appellee or any other party (even though aligned in the district court with the
first appellant) to seek to have the judgment below overturned or modified in some
respect.”); see also Harrell v. Harrell, 321 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (declining
to exercise jurisdiction over a judgment that the appellant did not seek to alter or enlarge).
176. See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2012) (describing “the principle of
party presentation” as “basic to our adversary system”); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S.
237, 252 (2008) (stating that the cross-appeal rule serves “the party presentation principle”);
Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722, 729 n.5 (Tenn. 2006) (recognizing “the
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In addition to being doctrinally atypical, this alternative approach
could also entail potential procedural complications. As a practical matter,
in actions involving multiple, independent parties represented by separate
counsel, each party wishing to perfect its own appeal would still have to
ensure that someone appealed and, thus, parties often would likely end up
filing multiple, separate notices of appeal. Failed attempts at coordinating
the filing of a single notice of appeal in such multi-party situations might
give rise to litigation arising from that very failure, and the appellate courts
might be asked to create special equitable rules to remedy such failures on
behalf of parties not at fault.
D. Fourth Proposal: Making a Jurisdictional Exception for Separate
Appeals Only
A fourth approach would be to remove the “separate appeals”
phrase from Rule 13(a) as provided in the first proposal and to reiterate the
notice-of-appeal requirements of Rules 3(e), 3(f), and 4(a), but to expressly
provide by rule that, in separate-appeal scenarios involving independent
rights of appeal, the appellate courts have the power and discretion to
relieve a party from its failure to timely file a separate notice of appeal.
This approach would eliminate the current conflict and would retain the
current jurisdictional function of notices of appeal in most cases, but would
incorporate the flexible spirit of current Rule 13(a). But as with the third
proposal, an unavoidable corollary would be that the strict jurisdictional
effect of notices of appeal would be weakened, and a new line of authority
would necessarily arise concerning the fact-intensive questions of how and
when courts may exercise their discretion to excuse the non-filing or late
filing of a separate notice of appeal. There is no reason to think that the
judiciary wants to add to its responsibilities as a general practice the factintensive analyses of determining whether to excuse the late filing of civil
appeals.
CONCLUSION
Tennessee’s separate-appeal problem needs to be corrected.
Because this problem is imbedded with Tennessee’s Rules of Appellate
Procedure themselves, a rule-based solution is appropriate. Correcting the
problem by reforming the Rules in one of the ways recommended by this
Article would render the Rules more coherent and would provide more
reliable guidance to litigants and courts.
Regardless of the solution, the problem addressed in this Article
requires thinking about the jurisdictional function of notices of appeal.
Were Tennessee not to provide that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is
adversarial nature of our court system”); MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 69
(discussing party-driven aspect of American appellate system).
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a jurisdictional requirement in civil actions, then the failure to file a
separate notice of appeal in a separate-appeal scenario might easily be
excused where appropriate. But any scaling back of the chosen
jurisdictional requirement would also inevitably give rise to a new set of
fact-dependent issues for Tennessee appellate courts to address. Should the
notice-of-appeal requirement be deemed not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional in civil actions? Any solution to the problem of separate
appeals cannot avoid making decisions about the vitality and scope of the
jurisdictional effect of notices of appeals and, in a broader sense, the nature
of appellate jurisdiction.

